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Abstract 
Title When handsets became smart - A case study on value migration 
in the handset OEM industry 
Authors Erik Lundin, Viktor Lundqvist 
Supervisors Ph. D Candidate Fredrik Häglund, Ph. D Magnus Johansson 
Purpose The purpose of this thesis is to describe the value migration that 
has taken place inside the handset OEM industry between 2007 
and 2011. Our second purpose is to see if we can create a 
framework that deepen the understanding on how to control the 
flow of value.  
Method A qualitative case study has been made with four different cases, 
representing four types of value flow. Interviews with expert 
analysts in the mobile industry have been conducted and 
secondary data has been collected and analyzed with an 
abductive point of view.  
Conclusions The main cause of the intra industry value migration is that the 
base of competition has shifted from product performance to 
flexibility, differentiation and speed which in this industry means 
ecosystem, brand and time-to-market. The asymmetric business 
models and the two-sided platforms have proven to be a cause 
of inter industry value migration. This is a natural cause of their 
nature, since resources is spent in one end and value is absorbed 
in the other, and if these parts operate in different industries, 
inter industry value migration has to happen. Our value flow 
framework has proven to be a useful tool to identify, measure 
and evaluate a value flow, regardless of the industry level it 
occurs on.  
Key words Mobile industry, handset OEM, iPhone, Android, value 
migration, business innovation, disruptive innovation 
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 Definitions 
Handset industry: The industry of handsets including the whole value chain, 
from component manufacturers to handset original 
equipment manufacturers (OEM). 
Handset OEM industry: Contains only the handset OEMs. 
Mobile industry: The whole industry regarding mobile telephony. Includes; 
infrastructure providers, network operators, handset OEM, 
services (IP based)/ OTT players, developer B2B ecosystem 
Samsung: Is by definition the whole conglomerate with all companies 
under the Samsung brand. However, except in sections 5.2.0 
and 5.2.1, when we write Samsung we refer to Samsung 
Electronics.   
Samsung Electronics: A subsidiary to Samsung which among other consumer 
electronics produces handsets. They also have a large 
department that produces handset components. 
Theoretical framework: Is the framework that is based on our theory chapter and 
shown on p. 25. 
Value flow framework: Is the revised framework that has its origins in the 
theoretical framework but is updated after the empirics.  
Value migration framework: Is the framework that is based on Adrian Slywotzky's theory 
on value migration and is used when we select cases to our 
case study.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The mobile industry is in constant change. In the beginning during the early 1980s, it was 
mostly marketed as a way for business men to be able to call from their cars, whereas now 
the business looks completely different. Global economic growth, economies of scale and 
technological development have made the mobile phone a massive hit, with a total user base 
of 5.9 billion subscriptions worldwide (Ahonen, 2012b). The mobile phone is not just a 
product like any other, rather it can be described as the same kind of freedom tool as the car 
once was.  In the last couple of years it has even functioned as a tool to tear down tyranny 
and dictatorships during the Arabic spring. (Ericsson, 2012) 
The mobile industry value chain now consists of the following five different sub industries 
(Ahonen, 2012b; Sharma, 2012): 
 Infrastructure providers 
 Network operators 
 Handset OEM 
 Services (IP based)/ OTT players 
 Developer B2B ecosystem 
This has not always been the case. The development of this industry was firstly driven by 
what we now call the infrastructure providers, providing everything from handsets to base 
stations. The pioneers were Scandinavia based Ericsson and Nokia together with American 
Motorola. Telecom deregulation and the increased demand on innovative technology paved 
the way for more entrants to the market. The existing players at the time begun to 
differentiate on different parts of the value chain and the structure of what we see today 
took form. (Ericsson, 2012) 
A mobile phone consists of numerous complex and highly advanced components. This 
affects the whole industry, making building handsets a very complex and advanced business 
as well. Production, assembly, development, processing and shipping are just some of the 
many activities involved in constructing a mobile phone. In some cases, handset OEMs do a 
majority of these value chain activities “in-house”, but in most cases, the value chain is 
2 
 
spread out among different companies (Nomura, 2012). This is one of the reasons why this 
industry is so complex and why it is so hard to fully understand. Many of the consumers are 
also on a 12-24 month contract from an operator. The operators often subsidize handsets to 
cope with the large user base needed to cover heavy fixed costs in infrastrucutre. This is yet 
another example of the complexity of the industry.  
During the last ten years, the appearance and design of the mobile phone has continuously 
changed. Throughout the years mobile phones have had different typing solutions (like 
QWERTY, 0-9 and T9), size and shapes. However, today it appears that only a couple of 
form factors have survived. To illustrate this (figure 1.1) we have sampled some of Nokia's 
newly launched mobile phones in 2004 respectively 2012. In 2004, Nokia offered a lot of 
different models; regular bar phones, slider phones, flip phones, QWERTY flip phones, 
gaming consoles as well as 
the notoriously strange 
Nokia 7280. In 2012, the 
only form factors offered 
were bar phones, 
QWERTY phones and 
touch screen phones. 
Something has clearly 
happened and intuitively 
it seems like handset OEMs do not compete on hardware design as extensively as before, 
implicating that there is something else that has become more important.  
1.2 Problem discussion 
As we have mentioned, the mobile industry is an industry characterized by its rapid change. 
The constant high demand of new innovations shapes the industry and makes speed crucial. 
New technology has the ability to disrupt the industry and change the rules of competition.  
We have chosen to examine the handset OEM industry from the year of 2007 and the 
reason for that is very simple. Apple's iPhone was released June 29th 2007 and that disrupted 
the market. Apple's iPhone is considered a disruptive innovation, meaning it severely 
changed the structure of the whole mobile industry after it was launched (Ahonen, 2012b, p. 
Figure 1.1 Nokia’s mobile phone releases in 2004 and 2012 
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92). These big changes came as a blessing for some, while others have failed in adjusting 
their business design in order to capture value.  
Former huge player Ericsson recently ended their joint venture with Sony and has stopped 
producing handsets. Nokia have in five years' time decreased their mobile phone sales by 
50% and have after 13 years on the throne been overtaken by Samsung as the number one 
mobile phone producer. At the same time as the iPhone caused trouble for the traditional 
handset OEMs, Google chose to release a mobile phone operating system (OS) named 
Android and licensed it out for free.  
Moreover, the introduction of applications opened up a completely new side of the market 
now accounting for more than 10% of the industry revenue (Ahonen, 2012b, p. 5). Average 
sales price on handsets has after ten years of declining recently (2010) changed pattern and 
are instead increasing. Since 2009, more people have access to the internet by phones than 
by PCs. Clearly, it is an industry filled with action and the need for proper information and 
projections about the future is enormous since as a player in this business, it is extremely 
important to “be on your toes”. (Ahonen, 2012a) 
During the last five years the boundaries of the industry have started to slowly fade away. In 
the 1980s, the mobile industry consisted of mobile handsets, network operators and base 
station and other infrastructure while today companies have started to use more asymmetric 
business models which have made the scope of the industry more problematic to define 
(Meurling & Jeans, 1994). For example, Google's main revenue source is online ads and at 
the same time they are present in the mobile industry with their OS. Amazon which is an 
online retail firm sells subsidized tablets which they use to drive users towards their retailing. 
Thus, in order for us to be able to examine these changes in an organized and structural 
manner we need a good theory that copes with this kind of issue as a starting point for our 
research.  
We will look at these set of events from the perspective of Value Migration, a theory 
presented by Adrian Slywotzky. The theory is about how value is migrating from companies 
with outdated business designs, to companies with superior business designs who better 
serves the needs and priorities of consumers.  
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The theory stipulates that there are three phases a company can experience Value Migration 
in; the inflow phase where value is flowing in to the company, the stable phase where value 
is not going anywhere and the outflow phase where value is flowing out of the company. 
Moreover Value migration can occur in three different levels; on a inter industry level (where 
value is migrating between industries), on an intra industry level (where value is migrating 
between companies inside an industry) and on a inter company level (where value is 
migrating between departments or products inside the company). (Slywotzky, 1996) 
There are already some studies on the recent change in the handset OEM industry (e.g. 
Cusumano, 2010a; Kenney & Pon, 2011) but they are not fully up to date and no one has 
connected them to the theory of Value Migration. Could Value Migration as a framework 
help us understand these changes?  
1.3 Research question 
With this background in mind, what is the reason for the rapid shift of power between the largest companies 
during the years of 2007-2011 in the handset OEM industry from a Value Migration point of view? What 
affects a value flow's direction and intensity? 
1.4 Purpose 
The purpose of this thesis is to explain and describe the value migration inside the handset 
OEM industry and apply existing theory to the cases that we are going to study. Our second 
purpose is to investigate if our value flow framework can generate further insights on value 
migration and if we can add to the existing value migration theory and thus help companies 
to better understand how to control the flow of value in an industry.  
1.5 Delimitations 
To start with we need to straight some things out regarding definitions on the terminology 
we use. First off, we will look at the definition of a mobile phone. We will use a definition 
found in “The Mobile Phone Book” by Meurling and Jeans (1994) that states that a mobile 
phone is a handset device using cellular network technology combined with radio technology 
for wireless connection. Moreover, the focus on this thesis will be on what is called 
“smartphones” e.g. a mobile phone which has the type of OS that allows users to install 
applications. This is a standard definition essentially used by all analytics and in all statistics 
(Ahonen, 2012b, p. 71).  
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Furthermore, we are only focusing on our part of the value chain, namely the handset OEM 
industry. When value is transferred from or to another part of the value chain, this will of 
course be mentioned, but our focus and starting point in every case will be from the handset 
OEM industry.  
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2 Methodology 
2.1 Value migration project 
We were approached by Allan T Malm, former dean of Lund University School of 
Economics and Management and now professor in strategy with a suggestion of topic on 
our master thesis. He wanted to form a group consisting of ten students working in pairs to 
each cover one part of the industry's value chain per pair. The idea was to analyze this 
industry with the theory of Value Migration with the delamination of the time span 2007-
2011. The reason for the research starting in 2007 is mainly because the iPhone was released 
during that year and it has a big impact on the industry. Since this project started in early 
2013, much of the facts and figures from 2012 were not available and thus the other end of 
our study was set to 2011. One of the other supervisors involved in this project was Andreas 
Constantinou. He is the founder and CEO of VisionMobile, an analyst company within the 
mobile industry and he has provided us with consultancy reports and good feedback 
throughout the research process.  
2.2 Overall approach 
Our purpose for this thesis is mainly to examine the value migration that has taken place in 
the handset OEM industry between the years 2007 and 2011. In order to fulfill our purpose 
in a satisfactory way we believe that the qualitative research method suits our thesis the most. 
The qualitative method (as opposed to the quantitative) emphasizes words rather than 
numbers, has a more loose structure and relies on rich rather than hard and reliable data 
which will fit our methodology (Bryman & Bell, 2003, p. 322). Our thesis has a narrow focus 
where it gives explanations on a set of events in a specific industry, indicating that our 
research is of a qualitative nature. 
However, in order to get a comprehensive view of the handset OEM industry and to allocate 
where in the value chain profit has migrated, quantitative elements have been added to our 
thesis. The quantitative research only works as a base and a starting point for our qualitative 
and more case like research and is thus not a main feature of our thesis. We have looked at 
companies' annual reports and used that information to cover the profit, volume and 
revenue streams inside the industry.  
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We started this thesis with a framework that originated in different theories and we have 
tried to apply them on our empirical findings, thus our approach is deductive (Alvesson & 
Sköldberg, 2005, p. 54). In deductive theory, the researcher starts with what is already known 
in a particular area and what existing theories that applies to it and then formulates a 
hypothesis which is tested through empirical studies. On the contrary, a thesis can have an 
inductive approach. The inductive approach is when the result of the researcher's empirical 
study becomes theory. Since our study has some elements of both the deductive and 
inductive reasoning, we have an abductive approach. (Bryman & Bell, 2003, pp. 23-24) 
Abductive reasoning is a mix between the deductive and the inductive and in reality most 
research methods is done in an abductive manner. Abductive reasoning lets the researcher 
work from existing theory and, depending on the result, the empirical studies could be used 
to verify theory or to add upon existing theories. (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2005, p. 55) 
We have done what Yin defines as a case study: “A case study is an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and the context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2003, p. 13). In our 
case, the contemporary phenomenon is the rapid value migration that has been taken place 
inside context, which is handset OEM industry. Since we have been looking at the most 
important and prominent events that have caused this value migration, we have chosen a 
multiple-case design.  
The cases we have chosen are: 
 The fall of Nokia 
 Apple's and Samsung's profit recipes 
 Google's and Amazon's subsidization of parts in the mobile industry 
 The handset OEM industry's absorption of technology 
A longer description of the cases will be found later in our paper as well as an explanation on 
why we have chosen these particular cases.  
2.3 Research design 
Yin presents some aspects and important issues to consider when choosing between a single 
or a multiple case design. Single case designs tend to give a more detailed view of the 
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“critical case” and are not as difficult to design. On the other hand, multiple cases are 
considered more robust since the evidence is more compelling and give are more 
comprehensive view. However, in order to get a compelling answer to a multiple case 
designed thesis, one must carefully select cases that serve a specific purpose and contribute 
to the research. To succeed with a multiple case design, Yin argues that a replication logic, 
not a sampling logic should be used when cases are selected. (Yin, 2003) 
As already mentioned, we have chosen to work with a multiple-case design by trying to pick 
out 4-6 events that can be analyzed from a value migration point of view. The reason for us 
wanting at least four events is that it suits well for a theoretical replication and we can try to 
find two contrasting patterns (Yin, 2003, p. 47). Ideally we would have cases covering both 
intra industry value flow and inter industry value flow. With fewer cases it would be hard to 
identify similarities between the different value migration patterns and to draw cross-case 
conclusions. We could have chosen to have even more cases but the work load would be far 
too big and the amount of research that would be necessary did not suit the time frame of 
this thesis.  
To illustrate how the research has been conducted we have used Yin's case study method 
model for multiple case studies (Figure 2.1). As a starting point we have the value migration 
theory which we have used when we selected the cases that we wanted to study.  
The case studies were then conducted individually and along the process we continuously 
questioned if the chosen cases fitted our model. If they did not, we had to rethink and 
possibly modify our selection. When the individual reports were finished, we analyzed the 
results we got from our research with the help of our value flow framework, and hopefully 
we have added further insight to the research field of value migration and to the mobile 
industry. 
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Figure 2.1 (Yin, 2003, p. 50) 
2.3.1 Interviews 
In order for us to add more reliability and trustworthiness to our thesis we have conducted a 
couple of interviews. We have tried to find persons that have been a part of the cases that 
we have studied and thus getting a detailed inside view of the events that we were examining. 
The interviewees are experts on the mobile industry and their knowledge and opinions not 
only gave us reliable facts but they have also helped us to decide which cases to write 
individual reports on. Before we conducted these interviews, we needed to decide how to 
structure them. 
With a quantitative methodology, Bryman and Bell (2003) suggests that the interviews 
should be done in an unstructured or semi-structured manner. In a semi-structured interview 
the researcher has a relatively detailed interview guide with topics that he wants to bring up. 
However, it is not essential that all topics get discussed nor is it important in which order 
they are brought up. The unstructured interview doesn’t need an interview guide, it is 
enough with memos containing brief notes about the theme of the interview (Bryman & 
Bell, 2003, p. 363). We wanted the people we interview to tell us what events in the mobile 
industry they thought were important so we believed the unstructured approach was the 
most appropriate since it let the interviewee associate freely. The unstructured interview also 
gave us room to ask follow-up questions on things we believed sounded interesting as 
opposed to the semi-structured that could constraint our ability to really listen to the 
interviewee and extract as much as possible out of him.  
Develop 
theory 
Design 
data co-
llection 
protocol 
Conduct 
1st case 
study 
Conduct 
1st case 
study 
Conduct 
remaining 
studies 
Draw cross-case 
conclusions 
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implications 
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Write 
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Write 
individual 
case report  
Write 
individual 
case report  
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During our research, we have made the following four interviews: 
 Andreas Constantinou – One of the supervisors of the value migration project and 
mobile industry expert. Founder of the analyst firm Visionmobile. Interviewed 
through Skype on March 21, April 18 and May 17.  
 Peter Bryer – Former Nokia employee. Worked for 16 years at Nokia and during 
the last seven years in the mobile forsighting group, analyzing future trends and 
technology. Today he runs a blog about the mobile industry. Interviewed in person 
on March 26. 
 Horace Dediu – Former Nokia employee and Apple expert. Worked at Nokia from 
2001-2009 doing strategy work and business development. Founded the analyst firm 
Asymco in 2010 and writes occasionally for the Harvard Business review blog. 
Interviewed through Skype on April 17. 
 Otto Sjöberg – Former editor-in-chief on Swedish newspaper Expressen. Now runs a 
consultancy firm helping companies develop their presence in the mobile/internet 
sphere. Made www.aftonbladet.se big at his time at Swedish newspaper Aftonbladet. 
Interviewed in person on April 12.  
2.3.2 Theory 
As mentioned earlier, our value migration framework is built upon Slywotsky's (1996) theory. 
We have also studied Clayton Christensen's theories regarding business model innovation 
and especially his theories on surviving disruption and over served markets. Moreover, the 
mobile industry has during recent years developed into a market where two platforms 
dominate, Apple's iOS and Google's Android. Hence we have studied Cusumano's theories 
on platforms in the technological setting and how network externalities, Lock-in effects and 
different platform strategies have affected the handset OEM industry.  
2.3.3 Literature 
The mobile industry has been growing fast during the last 20 years and the subject of mobile 
telecom has been researched on a lot. For this thesis there is a very good existing academic 
base which we have used when we examined our cases. There are existing theories on 
platforms, network effects and business innovation with corresponding articles regarding the 
mobile telecom industry but no literature has the value migration as its point of view. There 
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are also theories without any clear connection to the mobile industry that can shed new light 
on our topic when put in this context. Our selection of theories have been from the field of 
strategy. Within this field, the focus has lied on what the strategy field defines as value and 
change. Within these definitions, we have been searching for topics like value migration and 
disruption (disruptive innovation), illustrated in figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2 Value migration within the field of strategy 
Furthermore we have had access to a lot of consultancy reports from renowned firms in the 
industry such as Visionmobile, Nomura and Asymco. These have first and foremost 
provided us with figures and numbers that are too hard for us to otherwise get as a primary 
source but also with comprehensive analysis of different parts of the industry. Important 
figures such as component specific profit margins, market shares, average sale prices and 
sales by different factors have been gathered from the above mentioned consultancy firms.  
2.3.4 Reliability and validity 
In order to improve a thesis' quality there are four well-used tests that we have used; 
construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability (Bryman & Bell, 2003, p. 
306; Yin, 2003, p. 35). 
Construct validity is, according to Yin, the most problematic test in case study research and 
that corresponds with our opinion as well. When a multiple case study is based on events of 
change (such as our) the selection of events become very crucial. The change in revenue 
level inside the handset OEM industry can probably be explained by hundreds of variables 
and it is our job to, with some kind of logic, choose a specific set of cases. Yin presents two 
steps that must be covered in order to achieve construct validity (Yin, 2003, p. 35): 
1. Select the specific types of changes that are to be studied (and relate them to the 
original objectives of the study) and 
2. Demonstrate that the selected measures of these changes do indeed reflect the 
specific types of change that have been selected. 
The changes we would like to study is what Slywotsky's defines as value migration. Value 
migration is theory of how value migrates from companies (or industries consisting of 
Value migration 
Disruption 
Value + Change Strategy 
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companies) that have business designs poorly adjusted to the consumers' needs and to 
companies with business designs that in a superior way fulfills the consumers' needs 
(Slywotzky, 1996).  
To cover the second step we have used a framework based on Value Migration theory 
(Table 2.1). According to Slywotzky in his book Value Migration and as described before, 
Value Migration can occur on three different levels; inter industry, intra industry and intra 
company and in three different phases; inflowing, outflowing or stable (Slywotzky, 1996). 
From this, we have constructed a framework which we have been using, partly when we 
select our cases and partly in our cross-case discussion.   
Handset OEM industry Value flowing in Stable Value flowing out 
Inter industry    
Intra industry    
Intra company    
Table 2.1 Three different phases on three different levels (Slywotzky, 1996) 
To further increase the thesis' construct validity we have used multiple sources of evidence 
which makes our results more robust and we have also tried to establish a clear chain of 
evidence from our case study question to the finished report. Finally we have also had our 
key interviewees (with regard for their lack of time) review our case study before hand-in.  
According to Yin, internal reliability is only a concern in causal studies, not in exploratory 
cases (such as ours). External validity is the ability to generalize the case result (Bryman & 
Bell, 2003, p. 306). Single-case studies are often criticized for lacking external validity and 
that's one of the reasons we have chosen a multi-case study (Yin, 2003). To further improve 
the external validity of our research we have, as mentioned earlier, used the replication logic. 
Finally, the reliability test ensures that if the case study should me remade with another 
investigator, he would get the same result. The basics of maintaining a high reliability is to 
minimize bias and to make the work process as operational as possible. 
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2.4 Selection of cases 
The chosen cases are to illustrate big movements and change in the handset OEM industry. 
With this in mind and with help of the value migration framework, we have chosen the 
following four cases: 
 The fall of Nokia 
 Apple's and Samsung's profit recipes 
 Google's and Amazon's subsidization of parts in the mobile industry 
 The handset OEM industry's absorption of technology 
As our framework consists of two axis, one measuring the direction of the value flow and 
the other one showing where this flow is taking place, we quickly realized we wanted to have 
four different cases (Table 2.2). Two of the cases being inside the industry, where value has 
flown in (Samsung and Apple) and one where value has flown out (Nokia). Apart from that 
we also wanted to look outside the industry and see how the value has flown out from the 
industry (subsidization) and in to the industry (absorbing technology).  
Handset OEM industry Value flowing in Value flowing out 
Inter industry 3 4 
Intra industry 2 1 
Table 2.2 Revised value migration framework 
We have intentionally skipped the “stable” flow as it is harder to look at changes in that 
category. Also, finding value flows in the intra company would require a much heavier work 
load and does not fit in the given time frame of this project. We have also been forced to not 
study certain cases since we only have room for the most prominent. 
In quadrant one, we could have studied other handsets that have suffered the same drop in 
market share and in profit margins (i.e. Motorola, Sony Ericsson and BlackBerry) but since 
we want to narrow down our case studies as much as possible we chose the company that 
has seen the worst fall in both market share and profit margins, Nokia. In 2007, Nokia was 
the largest Handset OEM and captured around two thirds of all profit made in the industry 
and today they are making net losses and have not managed to capture much market share in 
the emerging smartphone market. Nokia also contrasts the company chosen in quadrant two 
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(Apple) in a good way since their respective rise and fall have been mirrored images of each 
other.  
Hence we chose Apple as one company in the second quadrant. Apple entered the mobile 
phone industry as late as June of 2007 and has since managed to capture around 20% of the 
smartphone market share and over 70% of the profit made in the handset OEM industry. 
When we further studied the industry profit share we saw that there was only one other 
company making a profit and it was Samsung. Since there were only two profitable 
companies it seemed interesting to research whether they shared the same profit recipe or 
not and how they have managed to stay profitable when no other company has.  
Regarding the third quadrant, the only distinct flow of value we could identify was the flow 
from other high-tech industries. The mobile phone has since the early 00s integrated 
components and functions from other industries such as the camera, GPS-navigation, sound 
recording, portable speakers etc. and we have researched how it has impacted the handset 
OEM industry.  
Finally, in quadrant four, we saw two possible studies that we could conduct. One was to 
study the trend of subsidization, where companies due to different reasons have chosen to 
subsidize parts of the mobile handset (such as the OS and the hardware) in order to capture 
value. The other study was to research the increasing power of the Electronics 
Manufacturing Services (EMS) which is the companies that provides the handset OEMs 
with the handsets. Since much of the assembly and components manufacturing is being 
outsourced, value is moving backwards in the value chain and is thus value is migrating out 
of the handset OEM industry. However, after some initial research we came to the 
conclusion that the EMS study would require much more research than we initially estimated 
but the subsidization research on the other hand felt reasonable in size and felt more 
adequate to our research due to the rising importance of platforms (that is being subsidized). 
The latter case also proves that hardware as a product is being more and more 
commoditized which is one point we have tried to emphasize.  
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3 Theory 
Value migration has not only been covered by Slywotzky (1996), instead there are other 
studies close to his within the same field of research. Other studies (e.g. Amit & Zott, 2012; 
Bowman & Ambrosini, 2000; Christensen & Wessel, 2012; Katz & Shapiro, 1985) have 
touched upon value migration. However, their main focus have been on other topics, e.g. 
why value migration occurs and how to defend yourself from value outflow etc. Together, 
the authors of these theories introduce similar ideas, even though the terminology could 
differ.  
3.1 Value 
The term “Value” in strategy literature is pretty broad, as it includes both hard measurable 
value (e.g. profit, revenue, sales) and harder to measure, soft value (e.g. talent, resources, 
customers) (Slywotzky, 1996, p. 50). Slywotzky (1996) estimates companies' value with the 
financial market as a point of view, taking the market cap and the stock value into 
consideration. Christensen (2003) on the other hand has the customer and the value 
proposition that the seller offer as his point of view when he measures value.  
Bowman and Ambrosini (2000) divides value into two sub-categories; perceived use value 
and exchange value. The perceived user value is what a customer is willing to pay for a 
product and thus, the perceived user value is biased and based on how the customer value 
different traits of a product as well as the customer's awareness of competing products. The 
exchange value is the actual amount paid by the customer for the product. Except in the rare 
case when the customer buys a product at the exact price of the perceived user value, the 
exchange value will be lower than the perceived user value (since a customer will not by a 
product where the actual price is higher than the perceived value). The difference between 
exchange value and perceived value is the consumer surplus. (Bowman & Ambrosini, 2000) 
The consumer surplus is important for companies when trying to control the customer's 
behavior. The consumer surplus is what consumers refers to as “value for money” and the 
consumer will always buy the product with the highest consumer surplus. Consequentially 
companies need, in order to be successful, try to keep the exchange value as low as possible 
and/or keep the perceived value as high as possible. (Bowman & Ambrosini, 2000) 
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The easiest definition and the way it is used in this thesis is when the term of value is 
something that gives the company a competitive advantage. Everything from profits to 
market share can fit under that definition and it also takes consumer surplus into 
consideration.  
3.2 Disruption theory 
3.2.1 Low-end disruption 
Clayton Christensen forms a theory on disruption and how a disruption can change the 
industry in its structure. He argues that industries evolve in certain patterns or cycles 
depending on whether or not the product the industry is producing is considered good-
enough for the general consumer. He exemplifies this by going through the evolution of 
computers from the days of mainframes to the PC. When the computer industry consisted 
of big mainframe computers, the product was not considered good enough by the main-
stream market. During these years, there was a tight connection between innovation and 
competitive advantage, meaning that the ones that were making the best computers were the 
ones that were making the most money. Competition was driven by product performance. 
In able to stay on the frontier of innovation, companies had to be integrated. As every single 
component had to be custom made in order to maximize its performance, there was a big 
interdependency between both the departments that made these components and the 
components themself. This was a necessity if the company wanted to keep on making better 
and better products, as the market was demanding them to do. In order to cope with this 
interdependency, companies had to be integrated so that people and departments could 
communicate more efficiently than going through the open market. (Christensen et al., 2001; 
Christensen & Wessel, 2012) 
From not good-enough to good-enough 
As the market matures, the product becomes better and better and soon it has reached what 
the main-stream market considers is good-enough. The demand is then shifted from wanting 
the best product (innovations on the frontier of what is possible) to differentiation, which 
means time, speed and flexibility. This shift is a natural adjustment from the companies' side 
to, when the market has reached maturity, focus on niche segments. The core of 
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competition has thus shifted from the basis of product performance to the basis of 
convenience, customization, price and flexibility. (Christensen et al., 2001; Christensen & 
Wessel, 2012) 
As a consequence of the shift in focus, former fully integrated companies tend to over serve 
the market by keep on doing what made them rich in the first place. The needed adjustment 
from making products that compete on its technological performance to making products 
that compete on other factors is hard to achieve quickly enough. Another explanation is that 
the search for the high margins they are used to draws them to a market so small that they 
forget about the main-stream consumers. (Christensen et al., 2001; Christensen & Wessel, 
2012) 
The most demanding customers are often the most profitable ones, and by serving them, 
companies can regain high margins and profits, even though volumes in this segment is 
smaller. When focus has shifted, the low margin activities are no longer so desirable, and 
companies tend to sell these or outsource these to new entrants of the industry. Often, they 
can undertake this segment with higher profitability by what Christensen calls a disruptive 
innovation, meaning a technological or business model innovation that better serves the 
customer's needs. (Christensen et al., 2001; Christensen & Wessel, 2012) 
“Those who control the interdependent links in a value chain capture the most profit” 
(Christensen et al. 2001, p. 77) 
Modularity 
This evolvement also has to do with the modularity of the product. As it has reached a 
good-enough state, the necessary components can be more or less standardized which opens 
up the market for suppliers and new entrants on the low end segment. Disruptive innovation 
is hence the innovation, technological or business model orientated, that results in a product 
 Not good-enough Good-enough 
Money makers  Integrated companies Suppliers, new entrants 
Market demand (focus) Frontier of innovation Speed, flexibility, differentiation 
Industry drivers  Technology 
innovation  
Business model innovation 
Table 3.1 Summary of the good-enough status' effect on the industry (Christensen et al., 2001) 
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that better serves the customers' needs. It is launched when a product has reached good 
enough status, much because it cannot be launched earlier when the product is not modular 
yet. (Christensen et al., 2001; Christensen & Wessel, 2012) 
Christensen describes this process in this quote: “Product performance almost always improves 
beyond the needs of the general consumer, as companies stretch to meet the needs of the most demanding (and 
most profitable) customers.” (Christensen et al., 2001, p. 74)  
Dediu (2013d) argues that the vulnerability for disruption is much caused by the incentives 
within the organization:  
“Market conditions changes because disruption happens. Disruption happens because 
products over serve. Products over serve because the incentives are to make them better. 
The incentives are like they are because engineers and managers are rewarded for it. 
You can go on with this chain of causality all the way down to that basic question why 
you do what you do. It leads all the way to the fact that value change and therefore has 
to change. It is not a question of when it happens because it always happens.”  
To summarize Christensen's ideas he gives a quote of the overall lesson he is teaching us: 
“Don´t outsource the thing that's going to make lots of money next” (Christensen et al., 2001, p. 74) 
3.2.2 External shocks 
Another reason that might initiate a value migration is what Slywotzky (1996) calls external 
events (or shocks). External events could be legislation (e.g. trade restriction), fast changes in 
inflation or political events (e.g. election or war) and they can affect customer priorities and 
business designs' value and profitability. This is events that is hard to predict but it is 
nonetheless important to be aware of the risk of external shocks. (Slywotzky, 1996, pp. 59-
60) 
3.3 Value migration 
Value migration was made famous by Slywotzky in his book named Value migration, 
published in 1996. It is a theory describing how value migrates from companies unable to 
adjust their business designs when the industry it is operating in is undergoing structural 
changes (a constantly ongoing thing, he argues) (Slywotzky, 1996). Slywotzky defines a 
business design with the following quote: “A business design is the totality of how a company selects 
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its customers, defines and differentiates its offerings, defines the tasks it will perform itself and those it will 
outsource, configures its resources, goes to market, creates utility for customers, and captures profit” 
(Slywotzky, 1996, p. 5). 
The theory is focusing a lot on business designs and he presents a way of grading them in 
order to further measure the business designs impact on value in and outflow. The grading is 
measured by a ratio, consisting of the two variables Market value and revenue. By dividing 
Market value by revenue you will get a relative number (size wise), telling us the markets 
valuing of the business design. Market value is according to Slywotzky a measure of the 
power of a business design to create and capture value. (Slywotzky, 1996) 
When dealing with multi business design companies where valuation and revenue of just one 
department (business design) is hard to find, Slywotzky suggests that you should “follow the 
customers”, meaning that figures like sales (of a specific entity if that entity represents a 
unique business design) or user base could be of importance. (Slywotzky, 1996) 
Slywotzky then presents the three different types of phases a business design (company) can 
be categorized in. They are named after the direction of the value flow, meaning the inflow 
phase of value, the outflow phase of value and the stable phase, where value is not going 
anywhere. (Slywotzky, 1996, p. 45) 
The inflow phase is characterized by limited competition, high growth, and high profitability. 
In this phase, a company absorbs value from other parts of the industry (or another industry, 
if the business design is changed in that direction). It can achieve this because its business 
design is better in meeting customers needs and priorities. Companies in this phase usually 
have a market value/revenue ration of >2.0. (Slywotzky, 1996, pp. 46-50) 
The stable phase is characterized by competitive stability, stable market shares and stable 
margins. In this phase, companies could experience value migration (both inflow and 
outflow) but the net effect should be close to zero. Companies in this phase usually have a 
market value/revenue ratio of 0.8-2.0. (Slywotzky, 1996) 
The outflow phase is characterized by competitive intensity, declining sales and low profits. 
In this phase, value is migrating out from the company to other companies within the 
industry or to another industry that have business designs that better meet the needs and 
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priorities of costumers. Companies in this phase usually have a market value/revenue ratio 
of <0.8. (Slywotzky, 1996) 
The value flows, as mentioned earlier, can be between different industries, within an 
industry, and within a company (where value is migrating between different departments/ 
business designs). 
3.4 Strategy in the mobile industry 
3.4.1 Business innovation 
In a market with a high level of competition, product differentiation become harder and 
harder over time. The reason for that is basically that you can only invent the wheel a given 
number of times. On such a market, what should companies do to create value? Instead of 
innovate products and focus on research and development, companies should start to 
reinvent their business model. 
By reinventing the business model, companies can create market space by attracting 
customers in a different way, but with the same product. One of the most famous business 
innovation story is when apple introduced iTunes in combination with their already existing 
product, the iPod. By doing something that nobody else had done in the digital music player 
market, Apple created a blue ocean and profited massively from it. Although there were a lot 
of equally good mp3-players on the market, Apple managed to capture most of the profit 
and their market capitalization increased from 1 to 150 billion dollars in just four years. 
(Johnson, Christensen, & Kagermann, 2008, p. 51) 
Johnson et al. (2008) explains what components a business model exist of. The far most 
import one is the customer value proposition (CVP). The CVP is the solution you present to 
your customers which in combination with a low price is good for a company's 
competitiveness. In order to have a successful business model, a company also need to make 
sure that they create value for their shareholders and provides a firm cash flow. By having a 
good profit model that can be assured. The two final components which a company needs 
to consider is their key resources (e.g. people, technology, products) and key processes (e.g. 
lean production or a unique operational model). (Johnson et al., 2008) 
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Business innovation can occur by doing several strategic moves. Amit & Zott (2012) have 
identified three different ways a company can innovate their business. Adding novel 
activities, which is much what Apple did when they incorporated iTunes in the digital music 
player market. Linking activities in novel ways, which is when structure innovation is central. 
And last by changing one or more parties that perform any of the activities, which is more of 
a governance focused rearrangement. (Amit & Zott, 2012, p. 44) 
3.4.2 Platform strategy 
Platform is a fairly new expression and has not been a subject of research for long. Originally 
platform was used as a “base of common components around which a company might build 
a series of related products” (Cusumano, 2010b, p. 32). These are what Cusumano (2010b) 
refers to as “product platforms”. However, during the late 1990s, researchers started to pay 
interest at another type of platform that had emerged. In the IT industry, industrywide 
platforms became increasingly popular like Microsoft with the PC and the browser with 
internet. Cusumano and Gawer (2002) came up with a definition in how to distinguish 
between the two platform types. They argued for two denominators that defined the 
platform as industrywide; the platform was provided as an inter company system and the 
company providing the platform had a clear strategy in how to make the platform 
industrywide. In today's mobile environment, platforms with its surrounding products and 
services are commonly referred to as ecosystems. (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002) 
The two-sided platform 
An important insight is that a lot of platform industries tend to be two-sided. By two-sided 
Cusumano (2010b) mean that the industry has two distinct groups that provides each other 
with products and services, through the platform. A common strategy in the two-sided 
network is that one “side” of the ecosystem gets subsidized or given away. Some reoccurring 
examples from the literature is windows which give away their browser but charge for the 
server and Adobe which doesn’t  charge for the reading software (Acrobat reader) but 
charge for the editing tool (Acrobat professional) (Cusumano, 2010b, p. 34; Parker & 
Alstyne, 2005, p. 1495). In many industries, such as streaming and advertising, the content 
consumers is the ones getting subsidized. However, in for example the multiplayer game 
industry, the consumers (players) are charged a fee to enter the network while the content 
developers get subsidized if they join the network. Parket and Alstyne (2005) have tried to 
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explain how companies choose which “side” of the network to subsidize and they come to 
the conclusion that it largely depends on “cross-price elasticities and the relative size of the 
two-sided network effects” (Parker & Alstyne, 2005, p. 1496). Another important feature of 
a successful platform is its network effects. 
3.4.3 Network effects 
Network effects are “feedback loops” that can grow at geometrically increasing rates if 
people and companies starts to pay interest in the platform. There are two types of network 
effects, direct and indirect (Katz & Shapiro, 1985). A direct network effect is when an 
increase in usage of the platform results in an equally big increase in the platform value for 
other users. An example of a direct network effect could be an increase in mobile phone 
subscribers on a new generation of mobile technology. The network's value increases 
according to Metcalfe's law which stipulates that the value of a network increases with the 
square root of the number of users (Webb, 2006, p. 20). Thus, as the network's user base 
increase, the network becomes more valuable (e.g. more people to call). Indirect network 
effects are an increase in usage of something connected to the platform that also increases 
the value of the platform i.e. an increase in DVDs has a positive indirect network effect on 
the DVD-player platform. (Cusumano, 2010b) 
These network effects, both direct and indirect, makes it possible for platforms to grow at 
immense speed. This dynamic and fast paced growth is what expands the ecosystem that 
connects external actors (Cusumano uses the word “complementors”) and their innovative 
capabilities to the platform which, in turn, draws more attention to the platform and the 
growth increases exponentially (Cusumano, 2011, p. 21). The awareness of network effects 
and its benefits forces the customers to form expectations regarding the size and potential of 
competing networks. Thus, the benefits of an economy of scale will vary with customers' 
expectations on the competing networks (Katz & Shapiro, 1985, p. 425). 
3.4.4 Walled Garden 
Mehra (2011) describes walled garden as a term that “typically refers to restrictions on user 
access or abilities that are, in some way, limited” (Mehra, 2011, p. 894). The “garden” is a 
network, a platform or something that enables user activity which is restricted with the 
“walls”. The “walls” of the garden does not necessarily need to be absolute but the entry to 
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the platform should be restricted. Another distinction of a walled garden is that it is difficult 
to for a customer inside the walled garden to access content outside the walled garden and 
vice versa. (Mehra, 2011) 
3.4.5 Lock-in effect 
Not only does the platform network externalities draw new users, it could also possibly 
create a customer lock-in. Customer lock-in is when the possibility for the user of the 
platform to switch to another platform gets decreased by high switching costs or other 
market barriers. An important aspect of the lock-in effect is that it does not necessarily have 
to be the value creating “part” of the platform where the lock-in occur. Google, for example, 
lock-in their customers in their OS (Android) and native applications (Gmail, maps, etc.). 
However, they capture value in their online services where they sell ads and other advertising 
solutions. This means that if, for example, a customer already has an iMac and Apple TV, he 
or she is probably going to prefer an iPhone because of the convenience of having as few 
different platforms as possible. If the customer bought an Android based phone, he or she 
would have to re-buy applications that already existed on its iMac and syncing e-mail, 
problems with Apple TV streaming and other compatibility issues would occur. (Kenney & 
Pon, 2011) 
3.4.6 Leader's dilemma 
One danger that platform leaders faces when their platform has settled is change. Since 
platform often (especially in the IT industry) are built on innovation and new technology, 
which is continuously evolving, leaders of the platform might be forced to adapt to a 
platform of a competitor. This was the case for Nokia which had to abandon their OS 
Symbian and instead adopt Windows' OS. (Cusumano, 2011) 
3.4.7 Entry barriers - Integration  
As earlier mentioned, companies need to be integrated when a product is no yet good-
enough. This means that the entry barriers for such an industry are higher than when the 
industry has matured. It is almost impossible for a supplier to survive if all their customers 
require custom made components, with no scale of economies to deal with asset intensive 
production. (Christensen et al., 2001; Christensen & Wessel, 2012) 
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Furthermore, Christensen has composed a set of barriers to help companies and 
management to understand how vulnerable a business model is for disruption. (Christensen 
& Wessel, 2012, p. 60) 
1) The momentum barrier (customers are used to 
the status quo) 
2) The tech-implementation barrier (which could 
be overcome using existing technology) 
3) The ecosystem barrier (which would require a 
change in the business environment to overcome) 
4) The new-technologies barrier (the technology 
needed to change the competitive landscape does 
not yet exist) 
5) The business model barrier (the disrupter 
would have to adopt your cost structure) 
 
These are all barriers that a disrupter must overcome in order to disrupt the industry.  
3.4.8 Responses to disruptive strategic innovation 
Charitou and Markides (2003) uses the term disruptive strategic innovation, referring to a 
market approach that is both different from and in conflict with the traditional way. This 
approach emphasize different product or service attributes and just like Christensen, they 
argue that the disruption start out as small and low-margin businesses and then improve 
over time. Eventually they are able to deliver performance that is good enough in the old 
attributes and superior in the new ones. Existing and new customers embrace the strategic 
disruptive innovation and it receives increased attention from media and established players. 
The focus of the study is that eventually, the established players have to respond to the new 
threat in some way. “At this stage, established companies confront an unavoidable fact: The new ways of 
playing the game are in conflict with the established ways” (Charitou & Markides, 2003, p. 57). They 
argue that there is a trade-off for companies when they decide on their strategy on 
responding. “A company that tries to compete in both positions simultaneously risks degrading the value of 
its existing activities and will experience major inefficiencies” (Charitou & Markides, 2003, p. 57).  
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They have identified five possible ways to respond to disruptive strategic innovation 
(Charitou & Markides, 2003, pp. 57-62): 
1. Focus on and invest in the traditional business 
2. Ignore the innovation – It's not your business 
3. Attack back – disrupt the disruption 
4. Adopt the innovation by playing both games at once 
5. Embrace the innovation completely and scale it up 
3.5 Theoretical framework 
We have tried to extend Slywotzky's value migration theory by creating a framework that 
includes the catalyst of value migration as well as a set of parameters affecting the size and 
impact of the flow of value.  This extension of the existing value migration theory is derived 
from other researcher's findings in the subject within the field of business strategy. We will 
later during the analysis apply this framework to the empirical results of our case studies. 
In order for value migration to occur, some kind of disruption must initiate it and therefore 
we have used disruption as a starting point in our framework. In turn, the value flow's 
magnitude is determined by the strategy of the company that it affects. In some cases, the 
company's strategy could be to create a disruption, but taking it one step further, their true 
goal is to absorb value, with the strategic disruption as a tool. The framework merge both 
the disruption as well as the strategy part of value migration which will give a broader and 
clearer overview of the change in focus. With this framework we hope that we can gain a 
better understanding of value migration and how it affects companies and industries.  
  
Disruption 
Value Migration 
Company’s 
strategy   
Figure 3.1 Theoretical framework on value migration 
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4 The fall of Nokia 
4.1 Nokia's company structure 
Nokia is divided into three business areas; devices and services, location and commerce and 
Nokia Siemens networks. Their mobile telephone business is included in devices and 
services which in turn is divided into smart devices and mobile phones. Smart devices 
focuses on smartphones and mobile phones consists of their feature phones as well as spare 
parts, related cost of sales and operating expenses. Nokia is listed on OMX and NYSE. 
(Nokia 2012 annual report 
4.2 From leader to follower 
When we look back at Nokia's position in 2007 and compare it to Nokia's position in 2011 
we can see that much has changed. Nokia, what you can describe as a traditional handset 
OEM, was 2007 the leading company in the industry and it had held that position the last 
decade (Steinbock, 2010). It was dominating the global market, and compared to its 
competitor their geographical presence was remarkable. With a home market consisting of 
Finland with its 5.3 million population, the rest of the world accounted for 99% of the 
company's sales (Steinbock, 2010, p. 10). The net sales on phones and services were 2007 37 
billion EUR and 2011 it had shrunken to 23 billion EUR (Nokia annual reports). In 2012, it 
had shrunken even more (15 billion EUR) and this year the phones and services department 
of Nokia was making a loss. To illustrate the decline in sales of Nokia, and to show how big 
Devices & Services' part has accounted for in the total sales, we have made this graph (figure 
4.1). There are two clear trends here; one is that both revenue and profit has declined since 
2007 and the other is that Devices & Services as a part of Nokia's total revenue has 
decreased.  
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Figure 4.1 Devices & Services' net sales and operating profit (Nokia Annual Reports) 
 
Other traditional phone makers like SonyEricsson and Motorola have also struggled a lot 
during the years 2007-2011. As the handset OEM industry actually has grown during these 
years, other companies must have captured new market shares (Ahonen, 2010; Ahonen, 
2012b). The market has not decreased and decreased ASPs are not the explanation. 
According to Visionmobile, the major mistake that Nokia has done is to make both their 
components and OS modular. Since they no longer have a unique and hard to imitate 
feature, they will no longer stay competitive (Visionmobile, 2012).  
4.3 Why did Scandinavian companies emerge as the leaders in the mobile 
industry? 
Nokia was founded in 1865 in Finland and was until the 1970s mainly a forestry, rubber and 
cable company. During the 1970s and 1980s Nokia started its transformation towards 
consumer electronics and in 1987, Nokia was one of the top TV manufacturers in Europe 
(Nokia n.d.; Steinbock, 2010, p. 1). The mobile phone market was very country specific 
during the 1980s, however, one of the big reasons for the success of Nokia was that the 
Scandinavian countries together managed to create the first 1G network with international 
roaming (Giachetti & Marchi, 2010, p. 1129).  
One of the reasons that it was developed in Scandinavia was because the Scandinavian 
countries had a long tradition of free trade and cooperation and when the mobile technology 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
B
ill
io
n
s
Net sales Operating profit Mobile phone department's share of net sales
28 
 
emerged during the late 1960s, the Scandinavian nations started a committee to enhance the 
development of cellular mobile networks (Ericsson, 2012). The committee was named the 
Nordic Mobile Telephone group (NMT) and consisted of representatives from Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden (Meurling & Jeans, 1994, p. 45). NMT named the 
system they created with the same name, NMT, and it was launched the 1st of September 
1981, in Saudi Arabia (Meurling & Jeans, 1994). The reason that it was launched first in 
Saudi Arabia and not in Scandinavia (where it was launched exactly one month later) was 
that Ericsson sold their telecom solutions to the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and a cellular 
phone system was included in the deal.   
Scandinavia was in the forefront of innovation and it was no coincidence that the first GSM 
(2G) call was made in Finland on a Nokia made network (Elisa n.d.). Both Ericsson and 
Nokia pioneered in GSM technology and during the 1990s they used the success of the 
Nordic cellular industry and expanded globally. Nokia lead the way and because of their 
ability to rapidly response to changes in both technology and customer preferences, Nokia 
was number one in handsets and second in infrastructure by the year 1998. (Giachetti & 
Marchi, 2010, p. 1132; Steinbock, 2010, p. 32) 
4.4 Nokia in 2007 
In 2007, Nokia held the pole position of all handset OEMs. They had the largest market 
share and the highest operating profits (Phone Arena, 2011). In Q4 2007, they were even 
bigger than their three biggest competitors (SonyEricsson, Samsung and Motorola) 
combined, almost reaching a market share of 40% (O'Brien, 2007). At the time, smartphones 
were a very small part of the total handset market and a vast majority of Nokia's profit came 
from feature phones (Ahonen, 2010). Nokia was very successful in the emerging markets 
and 56% of the sales came from Middle-East & Africa, China, Asia Pacific and Latin 
America. A minority of the sales, 44% came from Europe and North America (Nokia, 2007). 
Given the market trends at the time, the emerging markets were where the growth were to 
happen (Dediu, 2013d).  
If we speak in terms of relative technological skills and “know how”, we can take a look on 
Nokia's R&D spending and compare it to their competitors. During 2007, Nokia spent 5 
647 000 000 EUR (Nokia, 2007) compared to Samsung's 4 745 000 000 EUR (Samsung 
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Electronics, 2007), SonyEricsson's 1 173 000 000 EUR (Sony Ericsson, 2007) and 
Motorola's 3 188 000 000 EUR (Motorola, 2007). Not all of the R&D spending of the 
companies were dedicated to the production of handsets but it can still give you a hint of 
their capability in terms of innovation and product development. In nominal terms, Nokia 
spent the most money on R&D than any of their closest competitors. To summarize, you 
could definitely say that Nokia held a strong position in the mobile handset market 2007.  
4.5 Nokia's smartphone operating system - Symbian 
Symbian was the OS Nokia mainly used during 2007-2011. Until late 2008, Nokia owned 
Symbian together with other players in the mobile industry such as Ericsson, SonyEricsson 
and Samsung (West & Wood, 2008) but 
in December 2008, Nokia decided to 
acquire the whole company (Virki, 
2008). Nokia is the handset OEM who 
has had the tightest connection to 
Symbian even though both Samsung, 
Motorola and SonyEricsson have been 
using it on several of their devices.  
Nokia's biggest hit with Symbian was 
the S60 platform that was the OS for more than 180 million of their devices (Nokia, 2008). 
In 2009 Symbian's market share was 40% of all smartphone sales. The close partnership with 
Nokia as a full owner did not last very long and both SonyEricsson and Samsung decided to 
drop and stop producing Symbian phones in late 2010 (Samsung Electronics, 2010; Sony 
Ericsson, 2010). Three years after the 40% figure, that number had shrunken to 1% 
(Business Insider, 2013b). Nokia announced on 11 February that it would use Microsoft's 
Windows Phone as their primary software instead of Symbian. The slide above was showed 
to illustrate how Windows Phone would phase out Symbian as the primary software.  
4.6 Nokia starts partnership with Microsoft 
As the Symbian ecosystem with OVI store and the other services surrounding it started to 
decrease in popularity, Nokia realized that they needed to reorganize their business. Nokia 
was still the largest producer of mobile phones and their worldwide market share was quite 
stable at around 30% but their smartphone market share was on a steady decline dropping 
Windows phoneSymbian
Feature phones
Figure 4.2 Illustration of Nokia's OS switching strategy 
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from 60% in 2005 to around 30% in 2010 (Ahonen, 2010). At the same time, Microsoft's 
revenue was being threatened by other platforms from especially Apple's OSX. As more and 
more iPhone and iPad users choose an OSX instead of a Windows computer as their next 
purchase, Microsoft suffered from decreasing licensing revenues. Moreover, the increase in 
tablet sales and cloud-based document services meant that less office licenses were sold too 
(Vakulenko, 2012).  
On September 21st 2010 the former Microsoft's head of the business division, Stephen 
Elop, was appointed as the new CEO of Nokia and 17 months later, Nokia announced a 
“broad strategic partnership” with Microsoft (Nokia, 2010; Nokia, 2011b). How much 
Elop's former connection to Microsoft impacted the decision to co-operate is unclear. The 
partnership meant that Nokia would make Windows phones including Microsoft's services 
(e.g. the search engine Bing and the advertising service adCenter) and Nokia would merge 
their mapping service with Microsoft's (Nokia, 2011b). In excess of the software sharing 
Microsoft were to make quarterly “platform support” payments of $250 million to Nokia. 
This was according to Nokia supposed to just slightly exceed the licensing fees that they 
would have to pay for Microsoft's OS (Nokia, 2012). The announcement of a cooperation 
between Microsoft and Nokia was criticized by a lot of people in the industry and most 
notably by the Google employee Vic Gundotra who posted this tweet two days after Nokia's 
press release (figure 4.3) (Dediu, 2011b). 
 
Figure 4.3 Google employee Vic Gundotra's tweet (@vicgundotra, 2011)  
What Mr. Gundotra and the other critics meant was that Microsoft's decreasing licensing 
revenue and Nokia's falling smartphone market share would not cease because of a 
partnership and it would not affect the advancement of Apple and its iPhone.  
As a result of the partnership Nokia released a new smartphone series called Nokia Lumia in 
October 2011 (Nokia, 2011a). At first there were two Lumia phones on the market; the 
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high-end Lumia 800 and the mid to low-range Lumia 710. They were supposed to replace 
the old Symbian phones and Mr. Elop expected a two year transition period before the 
partnership were fully up and running. 
As illustrated in figure 4.4, Nokia sold 
24.2 million smartphones during Q1 
2011 (when the announcement was 
made) and in Q4 2012 (nearing the 
end of the “transition period”) the 
figure had dropped to 6.6 million 
(Nokia, 2011a). Of those 6.6 million, 
4.4 million were Nokia Lumias and 
from the release in O4 2011 to Q4 
2012 Nokia had shipped a total of 14 
million Lumias (Dediu, 2013a). That 
is a decline of 27% percent which compared to the global increase of smartphone shipments 
during the same period of 200% shows that Nokia is dropping in market share, fast.  
4.7 Nokia post 2011 
If we compare Nokia in 2007 to Nokia in 2012, much has changed. Their “pole position” as 
we described earlier has partly been taken away by Samsung which in 2011 took over the as 
the number one mobile phone producer. As shown in figure 4.5 Nokia still ships the most 
feature phones but Samsung has been able to capture more shares in the smartphone 
market. Nokia's market share has dropped drastically (figure 4.6) and it is mostly explained 
by the increased competition in the smartphone market. In addition to the dropping market 
share Nokia's margins have also decreased and in both 2011 and 2012 they made a net loss 
of 1 488 MEUR respectively 3 789 MEUR (Annual reports).  
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Figure 4.5 Mobile phone shipments 2011 (Dediu, 2012b; Nokia Annual reports; Samsung annual 
reports) 
 
Figure 4.6 Nokia market share (Business Insider, 2013b; Nokia Annual reports) 
Profit wise Nokia has gone from making a net profit of 6.7 billion EUR in 2007 to a net loss 
of 3.8 billion EUR in 2012. Much of the industry's profit has gone to Apple which, together 
with Samsung, is the only companies in the handset OEM industry currently making a net 
profit (Business Insider, 2013b).  
Nokia's geographical sales trend has been consistent over the last 5 years and in 2012, most 
of their sales (64 %) came from Middle-East & Africa, China, Asia Pacific and Latin America 
and the rest (36 %) came from Europe and North America (Nokia 2012 annual report). That 
is probably correlated with the increased smartphone penetration rate in the western world 
which in Q3 2012 surpassed 50 % in the US (Dediu, 2013c).  
327 340
96 77
0
100
200
300
400
500
Samsung Nokia
M
ill
io
n
s
Feature phones Smartphones
Rest of feature 
phones
Rest of smartphones
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
2009 2010 2011 2012
Nokia feature phone Nokia smartphone
33 
 
4.8 Nokia's technology 
Nokia had since the 1980s been one of the most technologically advanced handset OEMs in 
the world but was the decline in sales during the late 00s a sign that Nokia could not keep up 
with the industry's technological development (Giachetti & Marchi, 2010)?  
Nokia had already at the EFA in Berlin in 1999 introduced a concept of a media screen with 
touch screen with internet connectivity and terrestrial TV, ten years before tablets became 
popular. Bryer (2013) emphasizes that touch screens in general was something that Nokia 
knew would be the future of mobile 
handsets and one of the form factors 
that were developed. A result of the 
extensive touch screen development was 
the Nokia 770. The Nokia 770 was 
released in May of 2005 and was one of 
the world's first internet tablets (Nokia, 
2005).  
Bryer (2013) argues that new trends, devices and technology in the handset industry rarely 
surprises anyone inside the industry. “When you are outside the industry it feels like things 
are happening really quickly but when you are inside an industry, things really took a long 
time”. 3G was one of the major emerging technologies during the mid-1990s but it was not 
commercially available until January of 2002 (Bryer, 2013). Former Nokia top executive 
Anssi Vanjoki talked during the late 1990s about voice applications and how they could 
disrupt the market when 3G was introduced, at least 5-10 years before Skype and other voice 
services entered the market. Bryer (2013) gives several more examples of this predictability: 
In 2000 he saw a presentation about mobile finance (which has been introduced to some 
markets) and connected light bulbs (and other household innovations) which were under 
development at Nokia over a decade ago. 
4.9 If Nokia had the technology – why not an iPhone? 
Nokia's technological capacity was very well comparable to any of the other handset OEMs. 
They had the highest nominal R&D spending compared to their biggest competitors. Also, 
the multi touch technology similar to the iPhone's is presented in a TED-talk initiative by 
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Jeff Han in a video almost a year before the launch of the iPhone (TED, 2006). This 
technology was developed by a lab sponsored by Microsoft and Nokia, among others (Bryer, 
2013).  Nokia had all the hardware technology necessary to build an iPhone device before 
the launch it Bryer (2013) and Dediu (2013d). Dediu (2013d) describes their technological 
capability of building an iPhone as: “They pretty much had all the technology laying on their 
shelves and could, on any given signal, produce it immediately”. 
4.9.1 Nokia's relationship with the operators 
According to Dediu (2013d), Nokia's relationship with the operators was very deep and of 
strategic importance. Operators were their biggest customers as they also worked as the 
distributors to the consumers. The operators owned the billing relationship with the 
consumers and therefore, in product development discussions, handset OEMs would invite 
the operators to participate in the process (Salz, 2010). If they did not like the product in the 
development process, handset OEMs did not even bother to proceed as the operators were, 
in fact, their biggest customers. (Dediu, 2013d) 
The discussion of building an iPhone like product were held several times according to 
Dediu, but time after time, the discussion ended with the same argument; the operators did 
not like it. They could not see how they would make any more money out of a product like 
that compared to what handest OEMs were already selling. In fact, it looked like a product 
that would eat up a lot of bandwith. Also, by opening up the window to the internet with a 
proper browser, operators were fearing the impact OTT would have on their walled gardens 
and revenues. (Dediu, 2013d) 
A sign indicating the importance of the operators when it comes to product development is 
Nokia's tablet N770. Feature wise it resembles the modern handset touch form factor and 
Nokia, according to Dediu (2013d), could launch this because it did not have a cellular chip. 
That was a strategic decision, in order to avoid friction with the operators (Dediu, 2013d).  
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5 Apple's and Samsung's profit recipes  
Out of all handset OEMs, there are practically only two of them that are making a profit. 
These companies are Apple and Samsung (Business Insider, 2013b). This case study will 
examine these two companies and how they have managed to capture 100% of the profit 
made in the industry. Even though they have this in common, the companies differ a lot 
from each other. Apple is originally a computer company that during the last 15 years has 
gone from being a company barely surviving bankruptcy to now being one of the world's 
most valuable company. Apple has created a walled garden with its ecosystem and high 
valued brand. Samsung on the other hand is originally a Korean conglomerate, producing 
everything from ships to building mobile phones under Samsung Electronics, now an 
independent company of their own. Samsung has recently taken over as the world's largest 
mobile handset producer and has mobile phones with several different OSs and currently 
over 65 different mobile phone models compared to Apple's three. Although Samsung 
produces almost seven times as many phones as Apple in 2011, Apple's operating profit was 
4 times as large (Apple, 2011; Business Insider, 2013b; Samsung Electronics, 2011).  
This case will start by a retrospect on the two companies' history before our focused time 
period starts (2007-2011). It will be followed by the most significant and important events 
during the timespan for each company respectively. We will end by describing their current 
situation. 
5.1 Apple 
As traditional handset OEM has fallen in market share, new companies have emerged in the 
mobile handset market. One of them are Apple which comes from the computer industry 
and have in just five years' time shipped more than 350 million smartphones making them 
one of the largest smartphone producer in the world (Apple earnings releases 2007-2012; 
Business Insider, 2013b).  
5.1.1 History of Apple 
Apple was founded by Steve Jobs, Steve Wozniak and Ronald Wayne in 1977. It started out 
as a computer company, selling them under the brand Apple and later, Macintosh. During 
the 1980s Apple lead the way with computers as the Macintosh 128K (released in January 
1984) and the Macintosh plus (released in January 1986) which featured a computer mouse 
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(Apple, 2012a; Apple, 2012b). The successful sales resulted in that by the mid-1980s Steve 
Jobs, c/o founder and front figure of Apple, was one of the richest self-made men in the 
United States, by the age of 29. (Carter & Strange, 2011) 
To cope with the rapidly expanding business Jobs hired former Pepsi executive John Sculley 
in 1983. Sculley and Jobs did not go along very well and Jobs decided to try to get the board 
of directors to get rid of Sculley. However, the board instead decided to support Sculley and 
Jobs were removed from his managerial duties in 1985. Jobs continued without Apple and 
created NeXT, a computer platform company, the same year. Eleven years later, Apple 
bought NeXT in order to access NeXT's newly developed OS NeXTSTEP and Jobs were 
once again hired as CEO for Apple. NeXTSTEP was an application based OS and served as 
a foundation of Apple's new OS, OS X. (Carter & Strange, 2011) 
When Jobs returned as CEO of 
Apple, the company was in heavy 
financial burden and was only a 
couple of months away from 
bankruptcy. Nonetheless, Jobs 
managed to turn around Apple 
and in 1998 they were making a 
profit again. In 2001 Apple 
released two important music 
related products; iTunes and the 
iPod (Apple, 2001a; Apple, 
2001b). iTunes is a “jukebox 
software” that lets the user import, organize and buy songs on his computer and the iPod is 
a MP3 player. (Carter & Strange, 2011) 
The release of iTunes and the iPod in 2001 had a great impact on Apple's revenue. As visible 
in figure 5.1, Apple almost quadrupled their revenue and went from making a net loss to 
having a margin at over 10% in just five years' time. Four years after the iPod's release it 
became Apple's largest revenue source and on April 9th 2007, Apple sold their 100 millionth 
iPod making the iPod the fastest selling music player of all time (Dediu, 2009). iTunes as a 
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product did not contribute that much to the revenue (about 10% in 2006) however it was 
one of the foundations of Apple's walled garden strategy (Dediu, 2013d). 
Apple has changed a lot since it was founded; they went from being a rather small PC 
company in an industry dominated by Microsoft to being a company that, from time to time, 
(determining on the stock prices) 
has the highest market capitalization 
in the world (Kim, 2012).  
If we look at Apple in 2006, just 
before the iPhone's release, they 
were a successful company with a 
steady profit and a great annual 
growth ratio. They shipped over 
five million computers (17% more 
than 2005) and almost 40 million 
iPods (75% more than 2005)(figure 
5.2). Their main sources of revenue were desktops and iPods but in just two and a half years 
later a new product accounted for over 50% of Apple's total revenue; the iPhone.  
5.1.2 The iPhone 
On January 9, 2007, Apple announced that they were going to produce their first mobile 
phone. It was called the iPhone and here is how they described it in their press release the 
same day: 
“Apple® today introduced iPhone, combining three products—a revolutionary mobile 
phone, a widescreen iPod® with touch controls, and a breakthrough Internet 
communications device with desktop-class email, web browsing, searching and maps—
into one small and lightweight handheld device. iPhone introduces an entirely new user 
interface based on a large multi-touch display and pioneering new software, letting users 
control iPhone with just their finger.” (Apple, 2007b) 
The iPhone has since been released in six different models in four generations; iPhone, 
iPhone 3G, iPhone 4 and iPhone 5. The current iPhones for sale are the iPhone 4, iPhone 4s 
and iPhone 5. Overall the layout has been the same throughout all models with few physical 
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buttons and the iOS operating system. At first, Apple distributed the iPhone only for AT&T 
customers and later they expanded to other network operators in different countries (Apple, 
2007a). In Sweden the iPhone was available for customers at TeliaSonera from July 11th 2008 
(Apple, 2008b).  
How was the iPhone received? 
Similar to when any kind of new technology hits the market, it is hard to make people realize 
that the product's (in this case the iPhone) advantages and how to use it. However, Horace 
Dediu means that Apple is the only company that can do such thing. “You have to get 
people to recognize that this product is something that they want to buy and use. Most 
people are not sophisticated, and when someone provides a full plate [e.g. an integrated 
solution, as the iPhone] then it is more attractive. Consumers finally says okay I´ll try. That is 
apple, it is in their DNA.” (Dediu, 2013d) 
The iPhone was almost immediately a hit and, as mentioned earlier, it took Apple about six 
years to sell 100 million iPods but with the iPhone, the 100 million mark was passed in Q2 
2011, less than 4 years from its release. The 200 millionth iPhone was sold just one year later 
and as of Q2 2013, 356 294 000 iPhones have been sold (Apple's earnings releases). The 
iPhone's ASP is as of Q2 2013 around $610 and 
Bryer estimates that an iPhone's bill of materials 
is around $180 which means that they have a 
margin of about $430 per iPhone sold (Apple 
earnings releases; Bryer 2013).  
The iPhone gets competition 
The iPhone has for many years been the top 
selling smartphone and has since 2009 had a 
market share of approximately 18%. However, 
during the last years Samsung's top-of-the-line 
mobile phone brand, Samsung Galaxy, has challenged the iPhones number one position as 
the top selling phone. Due to dropping iPhone sales in mid-2012 and rapidly increasing 
Galaxy sales (figure 5.3) the gap between them is closing in.   
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iOS 
The iPhone has only been available with Apple's own OS, iOS (originally iPhone Operating 
System), and has come with preinstalled Apple applications such as Safari (a web browser), 
iTunes and their application market place App Store. The latter was released in 2008 
together with the iPhone 3G and today App Store is approaching its 50 billionth download 
(Apple, 2008a; Apple, n.d.). The iOS is, as iTunes, part of Apple's walled garden and is only 
available through Apple products. iOS is the largest ecosystem with around 800 000 available 
applications, even though the growth rate is faster in Android which is estimated to break 
the 1 million milestone first (Apple, 2013; Womack, 2012). However, measured per user, iOS 
receive higher revenue per user compared to Android (Business Insider, 2013a). 
5.1.3 Apple post iPhone release 
As mentioned earlier, the growth rate that Apple had during the first half of the 00s was very 
high. However what they managed to do from 2007 to 2011 far exceeds their performance 
up to 2006. In figure 5.4 we illustrate how much impact the iPhone has had on Apple's 
revenue. Apple has from 2006 to 2011 had an average annual growth rate of 40% and in 
2012, the iPhone accounted for almost 50% of the revenue. 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Apple revenue and iPhone volume (Apple earnings releases) 
The quarterly volumes of iPhones shipped have correlated very regularly to the revenue 
which means that the ASPs have been constant. According to Bryer, one big risk for Apple 
is if their ASPs starts to drop. “Apple's ASP has been amazingly consistent ... that's what I’m 
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really impressed about ... when that [Apple's ASPs] starts coming down, that's something I’ll 
really look out for … That's when the industry really becomes commoditized.” (Bryer, 2013)  
 
Figure 5.5 Operating profit share (Business Insider, 2013b) 
Apple's market share has also seen a very stable growth and by the end of 2012 they had 
20% of the smartphone market (Business Insider, 2013b). What is even more notable is 
Apple's operating profit share between the largest handset vendors in the mobile industry. In 
figure 5.5 it is visible that as Nokia has dropped in profit share in the same rate as Apple has 
gained in profit share and, by the end of 2012, Apple captured 72% of the profit made. 
Regarded that Apple sold about 5% of all handsets during 2012 they have the superior 
margins (Business Insider, 2013b). Except Apple there is only Samsung that has a significant 
share of all profits, all other companies are either making very small profits or losses.  
5.1.4 Apple's brand value 
Apple and its brand has for a long time been strong and has for over a decade been valued in 
the top 50s on Interbrands global brand ranking. Before the iPhone's release in 2007, 
Apple's brand was ranked number 35 and valued to 9,130 million USD and in 2012, they 
were second behind Coca-cola and their brand was valued to 76,658 million USD. In 2012, 
their year-on-year growth was 129% which was the highest increase of all top 100 brands 
that year. (Interbrand, n.d.) 
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5.2 Samsung 
Twenty years ago, Samsung was mainly an OEM focusing its strategy solely on low cost and 
as many other Korean kongomerates, Samsung has put their brand on many different 
consumer electronics such as televisions and microwave ovens (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). 
Through a unique business strategy, combining Korean low cost manufacturing with 
western-style brand strategy, Samsung has in twenty years' time transformed itself to a world 
leader in both R&D and marketing. In the 1990s, Samsung's brand was rather unknown and 
in today it is among the top brands and valued higher than giants such as Nike, Pepsi and 
American Express. (Khanna, Song, & Lee, 2011) 
5.2.1 Samsung's company structure 
The Samsung group has a lot of different subsidiaries and the handset department is located 
in Samsung's largest subsidiary; Samsung Electronics. Samsung Electronics consists of nine 
departments: Visual Display, Digital Appliances, Mobile Communications, IT Solutions, 
Telecommunication Systems, Digital Imaging, Memory, System LSI and LED. Altogether 
Samsung Electronics had a revenue of 150 billion USD in 2011 which is about the same 
revenue as Apple. (Samsung Electronics, 2011) 
5.2.2 Samsung Electronics 
Historically, Samsung could be described as a typical multi business design Asian 
conglomerate, involved in many different industries (Khanna, Song, & Lee, 2011). Samsung's 
handset producing department has become more important in the last couple of years, 
reshaping the company to a more focused and single business design company with handsets 
and handsets components as their core business (Dediu, 2012c). It is estimated that handsets 
now account for more than half of Samsung Electronic's revenue and more than two thirds 
of its profit. If we look at the volume (shipments of phones, total) the number has increased 
from 103 million in 2005 to 330 million in 2011.  
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Figure 5.6 Samsung mobile phone shipment (Samsung annual reports) 
In contrast with Apple and Nokia, Samsung produces much of its own components in house 
and can thus optimize their production and time to market. The three most expensive 
smartphone components are the NAND Flash (16GB is about $20-22) the display ($18-20) 
and the applications processor ($15-17) and altogether they make up about 37% of a 
smartphone's average bill of materials. In all of these components' markets Samsung holds 
the highest market share which is around 30%. (Nomura, 2012) 
5.2.3 Samsung pre Android  
In 2007, Samsung shipped 160 million handsets making them the second largest handset 
OEM in the world. The company was quite stable with a three year history of making a 
profit around 8.5 billion USD with a revenue climbing from 87 billion USD in 2005 to 105 
billion USD in 2007. In 2005, the department producing the handsets in Samsung, 
Telecommunication Systems, accounted for 26% of the revenue and 32% of the profit. The 
same figure for 2006 was 24% of the revenue and 8% of the profit. In 2007 the department 
accounted for 24% of the revenue and 35% of the profit. The biggest part of the revenue 
(27%) came from what Samsung called Digital Media, referring mainly to production of 
TVs, PCs and printers. Their most profitable departments were Telecommunication 
Systems, Semiconductor and LCD.  
Before Samsung decided to start selling Android phones, their smartphone market share 
were very low. They had some windows phones (like the Black Jack II) as well as Symbian 
phones (like Samsung G810) (Bryer, 2013; Samsung Electronics, 2007). The success of 
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Samsung starting to use Android as their main OS for smartphones is illustrated in figure 
5.7. Samsung sold around 6 million smartphones in 2009 compared to 212 million in 2012.  
 
Figure 5.7 Smartphone shipments (Annual reports; Dediu, 2012b; Earnings releases) 
5.2.4 Samsung reacts to the iPhone release 
As the iPhone was released in June of 2007, the market of second generation smartphones 
with touch input opened up. Samsung was one of few companies that could keep up with 
Apple as far as technology goes. One of the reasons that they could do so has to do with 
that , as we mentioned earlier, Samsung Electronics have a very successful components 
business and, in 2011, they actually supplied Apple with about 26% of the iPhone's 
components (The Economist, 2011). Hence, when Apple first ordered x amount of 
microprocessors before the iPhone's initial release, Samsung could draw conclusions 
regarding what volumes that Apple were expecting to sell and in an early stage decide 
whether to follow or not (Dediu, 2013d). However, even though they could use the same 
components as the iPhone, they could not use iOS which meant that they had to use an 
external supplier. Samsung has always used multiple OSs for their smartphones and when 
Android entered the market, Samsung was fast to launch some Android phones as well.  
Android was first released in October 2008 on a HTC phone and has since had a rapid 
increase in market share (Business Insider, 2013b). Samsung released its first Android based 
phone six months later named Samsung i7500 and in late 2011 they preceded HTC as the 
number one Android smartphone manufacturer (Business Insider, 2013b; Triggs, 2012).  In 
figure 5.8 market share by OS in the smartphone market is shown and the dark blue part of 
the Android field is Samsung's Android share. Despite Microsoft's dropping market share 
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Samsung has continued selling Windows phones and has as of May 2013, four windows 
phones for sale. 
 
Figure 5.8 Market share by OS (Business Insider, 2013b; Dediu, 2012b) 
 Samsung has also been involved in other smartphone OS developments and was one of the 
owners of the former number one smartphone OS Symbian (West & Wood, 2008). During 
the second half of the 00s Samsung divested in Symbian and instead focused on their own 
OS named Bada. Bada was released to the public at the end of 2009 and is available on 
Samsung's low range mobile phones. As of May 2013, Samsung sells four different Bada 
mobile phones (on www.samsung.com).  One year after Bada's release it took over as fifth 
largest OS (overtaking Windows mobile) and had around 3,000 applications available for 
download. However, in early 2012 Samsung announced that they will abandon Bada and 
instead cooperate with Intel and help develop the linux based OS called Tizen. Other 
companies in the mobile industry such as Huawei, NEC, Vodafone and Orange is also part 
of the Tizen project. (Bryer, 2013; Choi, 2012) 
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5.2.5 Samsung post 2011  
After the entrance of iPhone, Samsung has 
managed to maintain a strong profit share in 
the handset market and has increased their 
annual sales extremely fast. Samsung's feature 
phone sales have started to drop (figure 5.9) 
and that is being covered up by their annual 
smartphone sales which have tripled on a 
year-on-year basis since 2009 and in 2012 they 
sold almost 400 million mobile phones. The 
percentage of smartphones as a percentage of 
total mobile phone sales have thus been 
increasing and in Q1 2012 they accounted for 47%. In Q1 2013, the same percentage was 
61% (Dent, 2013). As earlier mentioned, Samsung has been moving their business towards 
smartphones. If we look at mobile phone market shares, Samsung has always been big. 
During the years our research focuses on, 2007-2011, Samsung has been the second largest 
handset OEM until they 2012 went past Nokia and grabbed the first place (Ahonen, 2010; 
Ahonen, 2012b). Samsung's mobile department has during these years increased in 
percentage of Samsung's total revenue (Samsung annual reports). 
As of Q2 2012 Samsung's mobile phone ASP is ranked as the fourth highest, after Apple, 
RIM and HTC. Apple's ASP is, as we mentioned around $640 and RIM's and HTC's ASP is 
between $300-400. However, as Apple's ASPs have been very constant, Samsung's has risen 
and is catching up. The reason for that is partially because of increasing global ASPs and 
partially because of Samsung's increase Smartphone share of total sales. 
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Figure 5.9 Samsung mobile phone shipment & 
ASP (Annual reports; Business Insider, 2013c) 
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5.2.6 The Galaxy series 
Samsung's flagship models are called Samsung Galaxy. The Galaxy line consists of many 
phones and most notably Samsung Galaxy S4 which is Samsung's most expensive and top-
of-the-line model. Although Samsung use Google's Android as a base, they have modified 
and added many Samsung-unique features. On the question why Samsung is able to capture 
more value than others, Bryer (2013) emphasizes the importance of those handset OEM 
specific features. “They [Samsung] have been a little bit more innovative. Very small things 
[have made difference]. They have been taking these tiny little incremental steps … If you 
for example look somebody up in your phonebook on your device and then you hold it to 
your ear you will call.” (Bryer, 2013) As mentioned earlier, Samsung Galaxy is catching up to 
the iPhone in terms of shipments and in December 2012, they were neck and neck (Leonard, 
2013).  
5.2.7 Samsung's brand value 
Samsung has invested a lot in in its brand value in 
recent years. In 2012 they were one of the main 
sponsors of the London Olympic Games and their 
strong position in the smartphone market has made 
their brand value increase with 40% during 2012 
according to the Interbrand global brand ranking. 
They are currently ranked eight, six places behind 
their main competitor Apple according to the same 
ranking. (Interbrand, n.d.) 
Samsung electronics has during the last years had a 
very high advertisement spending, visible in figure 
5.10. In 2011 Samsung electronics spent around 3 billion USD which is almost as much as 
Coca-Cola, which is the world's most valuable brand. In comparison to Apple, it is clear that 
Samsung is expending significantly more than its competitors (other companies in the IT 
business such ass Dell and Microsoft have advertising expenses equal to Apple). (Dediu, 
2012d) 
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6 Google's and Amazon's subsidizations 
As earlier cases have focused on value migrating between companies but within the industry 
(handset OEM industry), this case is about value migrating between industries. We have 
looked how companies that earlier were not a part of the industry now have entered and 
changed the rules of competition for all players. Our companies are Amazon, coming from 
the retail industry and Google, whose core business lies in selling ads. They have both 
entered the handset industry, Amazon with their tablet Kindle and Google with their OS 
Android. Google provides Android for free and Amazon are selling their tablets around the 
production cost (Dediu, 2012a). What they have in common is that they subsidize their 
products as a strategic move to gain profits from somewhere else.  
6.1 Amazon's Kindle 
6.1.1 What is Kindle? 
Kindle is the brand under which Amazon sells their tablets and e-readers. Their tablets goes 
under the name of Kindle Fire and their e-readers are sold under names like Kindle 
Paperwhite and Kindle 1. All of their current models are equipped with Wi-Fi and others 
with Wi-Fi and 3G/4G cellular chips. On amazon.com, they range from 69 $ to 399$ and 
they can be bought from Amazon's website or regular department stores. The first kindle 
was launched late 2007 and was quickly sold out (Amazon, n.d-b). Since then, Amazon 
shipped 2.5 million kindles in 2009, 8 million Kindles in 2010 and 18 million Kindles in 2011 
(Business Insider, 2012). Just like Apple bundles their iPad and iPhone experience with their 
App Store, Kindle uses Amazons platform to form their ecosystem. They are both metal-to-
cloud players, meaning they as a single company can offer both the hardware you are holding 
(the handset, tablet) and the content and services you are consuming. The user experience 
thus became integrated and Amazon, specially, complements its devices with the retailing of 
content. Examples of that could be e-books, videos, music and applications. (Schuermans, 
2012a) 
On their more advanced devices (Kindle Fire), Android is used as their OS. Amazon has 
made their own version of the Android OS, adapting it to their intended way of using it 
(Schuermans, 2012a). This involves clearer connections to the rest of Amazons ecosystem 
and it makes the tablet different in user experience from other Android powered tablets. It is 
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also equipped with a home built browser called Silk. Silk is a further tool to gain insight of 
Amazon's customers and to draw traffic to Amazon's retail channel, its web site.  
6.1.2 Amazon's History 
Amazon was founded in 1994 by Jeff Bezos. He is still the CEO and president of the 
company, holding 20% of the company's shares. In the beginning, Amazon sold only books. 
Their first sold title was "Fluid Concepts & Creative Analogies: Computer Models of the Fundamental 
Mechanisms of Thought" by Douglas R. Hofstadter. In May 1997, Amazon announced its IPO 
and it was traded on NASDAQ under the name AMZN. It expanded its businesses by 
starting selling DVDs in 1998 and in that year, they also acquired the popular webpage 
Internet Movie Database (IMDb). It was also the year they went overseas, opening up 
Amazon.co.uk (UK) and Amazon.de (Germany). The following year was a year of 
expansion. The following new departments were opened: Home Improvement, Software, 
Video Games, Gift Ideas, Consumer Electronics and Toys & Games. Founder Jeff Bezos 
was also announced “Person of the Year” by Times Magazine. In 2000 and 2001, the growth 
continued and Amazon revealed new partnerships with other retailers such as Toys “R” Us, 
Target and Border Group. The rest of the decade consisted of growth and expansion. Health 
& Personal Care, Gourmet Food, Sports & Outdoor, Apparel & Accessories, Office 
Products, Jewelry, Wedding and Grocery is just some of the new departments added to 
Amazons range of products. A part from organic growth, Amazon has acquired a series of 
companies during its history. The most prominent ones being LOVEFiLM International 
Limited, Zappos.com, AbeBooks, Fabric.com, Shopbop.com, Joyo.com, Alexa Internet and 
former mentioned IMDb. Their subsidiary Alexa is a company 
that ranks webpages after a certain set of factors and its 
owners, Amazon.com, is ranked 7th globally. (Amazon, n.d-a) 
Amazons logo is set to present the range of products Amazon sells, with the arrow forming 
a smile going from A-Z (Dinesh, n.d.).  
6.1.3 Amazon post Kindle 
Apart from selling tablets, Amazon is one of the world's largest retailer. They sell their 
products from their website and in 2012 they had net sales over 61 billion USD. The same 
figure for 2011 was 48 billion USD and 2010 34 billion USD. Their home market, United 
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States, has accounted for around 42% for each of the past three years (Amazon, 2012). How 
big part of that sales that is derived from selling Kindles is hard to tell but if we count high 
and let the most expensive models price stand for the ASP for all Kindles, that figure would 
be 7.2 billion USD. The real number is probably much lower and according to Horace 
Dediu and Asymco, Kindle Fire accounted for 5 of the 18 million total units sold. 
Furthermore, he argues that Amazon is hardly making any money out of this so profit wise 
the figure would be close to nothing if not a direct operating loss (Dediu, 2012a). Instead, 
the Kindle has a big strategic importance for Amazon's core business.  
Out of all of Amazon's retail sales, content as in Media, including books, music, movies, 
games and software, accounts for around 39% of all their sales. The rest is general 
merchandise (58%) and other (3%). Therefore it is important not only to promote things 
that you can consume from a Kindle device but also to draw traffic to the bigger part of the 
business. The Kindle works both ways here, both as a distribution channel for the media 
content but also as a promoting tool for the rest of the business. Amazon spends big 
amounts of their advertising budget on search engine optimization, and part of their effort 
with their Silk browser is to cut that spending by controlling the customer flows instead of 
purchasing sponsored links from e.g. Google. Their browser has some unique characteristics, 
with a lot of the processing taking place at Amazon's servers instead of at the consumer's 
handset. This makes it extra suitable for handset devices with smaller processing power and 
it also optimizes the data in a smart way that saves bandwidth. That is also attractive in rural 
areas where 3G and 4G reception can be poor. The next step would be for Amazon to 
launch an own branded smartphone as well as letting other handset OEMs license the Silk 
Browser. (Schuermans, 2012b)  
50 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Kindle unit sales and active users of Amazon (Amazonstrategies, n.d.) 
In figure 6.1, the sales of Kindles are illustrated in orange and active Amazon users is 
illustrated in blue. Kindle sales volume has been very volatile whereas Amazon's active users 
have grown steadily at an average of 6% quarterly.  
6.2 Google's Android 
Google is one of the largest IT companies in the world and its main source of revenue has 
throughout the years been online advertisement. When they in 2008 introduced their 
Android for free many analyst firms and 
researchers thought that it was a strategic move 
of Google with the intentions of lower the 
costs of a smartphone and thus lowering the 
entry barriers to mobile internet and thus lower 
the barriers to Google's main revenue source, 
online advertising (Bryer 2013; Dediu 2013; 
Kenney & Pon 2011; Visionmobile 2011). 
After 15 months from its release, Android 
managed to capture 25 percent of the 
smartphone sales (Kenney & Pon, 2011, p. 
249). Android has emerged as one of the most popular OSs with the biggest market share 
and over 300,000 applications available (2011) (Vision Mobile, 2011). Mobile advertising still 
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accounts for a very small part of the total online advertising expenses and in the U.S. it was 
about 3.5% in 2011 (figure 6.2). 
6.2.1 History of Google 
Google was founded in 1998 by the two former Stanford University students Larry Page and 
Sergei Brin. They had a couple of years earlier, during their time at Stanford developed a 
search engine that was called BackRub. It was running on Stanford's own servers and due to 
high internet traffic the website was shut down in 1996. Page and Brin then started Google 
which almost immediately emerged as one of the world's top search engines and in June of 
2000 they had an index of over 1 billion web pages which made Google the largest search 
engine of them all. (Google, n.d.) 
Google has since expanded their business with products like Google Maps, News, Translate, 
Mail, Plus, Scholar, Drive and many more. They have also acquired the online video 
streaming service YouTube and mobile phone company Motorola. (Google, n.d.) 
6.2.2 Android 
Android is a Linux based OS, founded by Andy Rubin and Rich Miner in 2003 (Markoff, 
2007). It was acquired by Google in 2005 with the intention to strengthen Google's presence 
in the mobile industry. It is free of charge to license Android from Google, and many of the 
largest handset OEMs sell Android devices.  Android's user base has since its release grown 
in size and today, 1.3 million Android phones are activated on a daily basis, compared to the 
300 000 births worldwide (Leonard, 2013). Android's market share is 72% and it has grown 
rapidly. From practically selling nothing in 2009, over 400 million units with android as the 
OS was sold in 2012 (graph 6.3). You can clearly say that Android is the market leader in 
handset OS, with its biggest competitor being iOS, holding around 20% of new sales 2012. 
The rest of the market is very fragmented with OSs like Bada, Windows Phone, RIM and 
Symbian as the biggest of the others. (Ahonen, 2012b) 
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Figure 6.3 Market share by OS (Business Insider, 2013b) 
Android is both sold as an OS for smartphones and for tablets, but smartphones accounts 
for the vast majority of all Android devices (above 90%) (Business Insider, 2012). Samsung 
is Android's biggest distribution channel, selling around 40% of all Android devices 2012. 
Google also sells Android smartphones and tablets under its own brand, Nexus, 
manufactured by other handset OEMs like Samsung, HTC and LG.  
Google has seen a growth in its revenues over the past three years. In 2010, they had 
revenues of 29 billion USD, growing to 38 billion USD in 2011 and 50 billion USD in 2012 
(Google, 2012). In 2011 and 2010, advertising accounted for 96% of the revenue but that 
figure decreased to 87% in 2012, much because of the acquisition of Motorola Mobile. 
Google's core business is ads, mainly through their popular search engine. That search 
engine has grown into a sphere that has integrated search to their other popular products like 
video (YouTube), maps (Google Maps) and e-mail (GMAIL). 
6.2.3 What has Android done to the handset OEM industry? 
According to Visionmobile, Android has made the market concentration less dense. Two 
years after Android's release, the number of companies with a global market share of more 
than 2% had gone from six to ten. Visionmobile also argues that the only way to make profit 
with an Android device is through speed or vertical integration (e.g. Samsung which controls 
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both components and handsets). “Android OEMs are in a race to the best device, a race 
which cannot be won” meaning that the device itself is not a basis of competition.  
Horace Dediu believes that Samsung's position as the only profit making Android handset 
maker could be threatened if the Chinese handset OEMs catch up in terms of technology. 
“Nothing will distinguish a Samsung android phone from a Huawei android phone in a 
couple of months or a couple of years.” (Dediu, 2013d). 
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7 Absorption of Technology – The handset OEM industry's value 
capturing 
The last case is about the absorption of technology and the value that the handset OEM 
industry has taken from surrounding industries of consumer electronics. The form factor, 
the performance and the technology inside a smartphone has changed drastically during our 
time frame 2007-2011. Out of the global mobile phone installed base, the feature GPS has 
grown from 1% to 19% and Camera has grown from 55% to 82% (Ahonen, 2012b).  
7.1 The GPS industry – Use of GPS in mobile phones 
Practically all smartphones are provided with some sort of GPS feature. This feature can be 
used both as a push technology, meaning that the feature is activated upon the users request 
providing the user with information, or as a pull technology, where it is activated by 
something else, an application or perhaps a mobile webpage while browsing. This gives the 
feature special characteristics, and the usage of the GPS feature vary a lot (Sjöberg, 2013). 
The most prominent use of GPS in handsets is maps, where the GPS tells the handset and 
the user their location. Furthermore, location can be used by applications and webpages. If 
you for instance are looking for a nice place to eat in an area you are not familiar with, there 
are applications like urbanspoon and yelp to help you find places nearby reviewed by other 
uses. Other areas that uses the GPS feature in mobile are game applications (Gowalla), social 
applications (Facebook), local news applications (ACCU WEATHER), health applications 
(RunKeeper), children or pet tracking applications (RoomEO), service applications 
(TaskRabbit) and tourist guide applications (Pocketguideapp) among others. (Sales, 2010)  
There are also examples of how webpages and applications with ads as a revenue source are 
using the GPS to better match the ads with possible consumers. If your location is Las 
Vegas, it is more likely that you will consume the service of gambling rather than the service 
of boat rental (hint; it lies in the dessert).  
When it comes to pure mapping services, there are two different categories of applications; 
the native applications included in the OS and the OTT applications available on the 
different platforms such as Google Play and App Store. One example of this is Google 
Maps, available for Android, RIM, iPhone, Nokia s60 (Symbian) and Windows Phone 
devices. Nokia's HERE map service, Windows' Bing Maps and Apple's iOS Maps are other 
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examples of this. The other category is when the GPS is used in a map service from a 
company that are not considered as a part of the mobile industry but rather the traditional 
GPS industry or map industry. GPS producer TomTom are an example of that, providing a 
navigation application for Europe for around $55 and America for $73 on Google Play.   
7.1.1 Sales on GPS – Mobile vs. traditional 
In 2011, 42 million GPS units (personal navigation devices) 
were sold globally (O'Brien, 2010). If we assume that all 
smartphones are equipped with a GPS, then the corresponding 
number for GPS devices sold as a part of a handset would be 
around 471 million units (Business Insider, 2013b). If only half 
of the smartphones had a GPS feature, the vast majority of all 
handheld personal navigation devices would still be sold as 
mobile handsets. Then we have not accounted for all tablets 
with a GPS feature. Industry specialists Berg Insight projects a 
decline in traditional GPS sales from 2011's 42 million units to 
30 million units in 2015 (O'Brien, 2010). Many of the GPS 
companies have multiple business designs, selling GPSs both 
to private consumers and for professional use in industries like 
maritime and aviation so their sales figures are not much of use when searching for a trend.  
As handset OEMs have taken a big part of the GPS market, traditional GPS companies have 
launched more differentiated products. Both big players Garmin and TomTom provide 
product lines specialized for training, with arm wrist watches equipped with a GPS in order 
to track the jogging or the kayaking. While TomTom sells their map services on the mobile 
platforms as an app, Garmin has launched its own smartphone, Garminfone, sold at the 
joint website garminasus.com. It is an Android device, built by Asus and apart from other 
phones it specializes on navigation.  
7.2 The camera industry - Market moving to camera phones 
Mobile phones are used instead of a traditional camera when taking pictures in 9 out of 10 
times. Almost half of the installed base of mobile phones are equipped with a camera with a 
resolution of 3 megapixels or more. 2003 was the year when sales of camera phones 
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surpassed sales of digital cameras. Four years later, in 2007, the number of camera phones in 
use was higher than total cumulative sales of all cameras ever manufactured, both film-based 
and digital. In 2010, the total installed base of mobile phones equipped with a phone 
matched half the global population. (Ahonen, 2012a; Ahonen, 2012b) 
7.2.1 Cameras in phones 
The way we use cameras in phones differs from the way we use them in traditional cameras. 
Except from the pure camera function, snapping photos and saving them on the phones 
memory, there is a broad variety of usage. The main areas of usage of the camera feature on 
a phone varies from sharing, editing, uploading (cloud), documenting and scanning etc. 
Sharing photos can be done with several applications, and from many of the phones OS. 
Instagram is one of those applications, allowing the user to use filters as a part of their 
editing of the picture before uploading it on their platform, making it visible for the users 
connected friends and others. The company was recently bought by Facebook, which also 
provides the same feature but with another user interface. The acquisition cost Facebook 
around 1 billion USD. (Kederstedt, 2012) 
Different cloud services, such as Dropbox, is also an availability for some of the user of 
camera phones. This gives the user the alternative to not only save the pictures on the 
handsets memory but also upload it and save it on the cloud service company's servers. 
Handset OEM HTC has made a deal with Dropbox, permitting every HTC buyer to receive 
an extra 25 GB space on their Dropbox account. Dropbox describes its service by referring 
to how sad it is to lose your phone when all your pictures gets lost too where the hardware 
can be replace but the pictures are lost forever (Dropbox, n.d.).  
A complete other way of using the phones camera is to scan things. The camera scans a 
matrix barcode (a 2-dimensional barcode) and then activates a response. One usage is URL 
addresses, where the user scans a matrix barcode and then automatically launches a webpage 
instead of typing in the URL character by character. A popular matrix barcode system is the 
QR-codes, first invented by the Toyota subsidiary Denso Wave Inc. in 1994 (Furth, 2011). 
There are several different QR-code scanners available on different OS platforms.  
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7.2.2 The camera industry 
In the camera market, there is a division 
between what the industry call point-and-
shoot (PAS) cameras and single-lens reflex 
cameras (SLR). PAS cameras (often called 
compact cameras) are the category that 
resembles camera phones the most, since 
SLR cameras are much more advanced and 
bigger (less mobile). The biggest vendors of 
PAS cameras are Canon (19%), Sony (17.9%) 
and Nikon (12.6%) (Sawa, 2011). During the 
years 2008 to 2010, Sony reported a decline in 
compact digital cameras from 23.5 million units in 2008, 22 million units in 2009 and 21 
million units in 2010. Even though volume went down from 2009 to 2010, their market 
share went up from 21% to 22%, indicating 
that the market shrunk between those years. 
Their division selling compact cameras, 
former called Video and now under the 
name Digital Imaging, have seen declining 
numbers on sales since 2007. This is 
illustrated in figure 7.1. (Sony annual 
reports) 
We have also extracted the sales from 
Nikons compact cameras and illustrated it in figure 7.2. The numbers were only available 
from 2007-2010. Compact cameras accounted for 30% of all camera sales 2007 and in 2010, 
the figure had decreased to 25%. After 2010 they consolidate all camera sales (including 
SLR) in one number which is why figure 7.2 ends in 2010. (Nikon annual reports) 
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Figure 7.2 Digital Imaging (Video) Sony, revenue 
(Sony Annual reports) 
Figure 7.1 Compact camera sales Nikon (Nikon 
annual reports) 
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Nikon's volume of digital cameras has 
steadily increased from 2009 (figure 7.3). 
Unfortunately, they do not reveal numbers 
on volume for all the years, and the same 
goes for sales on compact cameras. The only 
years that is visible in both graphs are 2009 
and 2010, where we can see a decline in sales 
but an increase in volume, indicating lower 
ASPs.  
Canon's numbers are so consolidated that it is not possible to say anything about sales on 
digital compact cameras.  
7.2.3 A new product segment 
Samsung has launched a product that shares characteristics from both the segment mobile 
handsets and the segment compact cameras. It is called the Galaxy Camera, a camera 
running on Android OS Jellybean 4.1, equipped with both a 3G sim card slot and Wi-Fi. 
You can also send text messages on it, with the only thing missing from being a smartphone 
is the phone feature.  Nikon has also released a similar product, the Nikon Coolpix S800c, 
but unlike Samsung's, it does not have a cellular chip. By combining the application feature 
of a smartphone and internet connectivity with the proper camera found in a compact 
camera, these products are in a category of its own. Just as smartphones and tablets, they can 
access all applications available on the different platforms and they also share the advantage 
of sharing the photos taken both for storage (cloud services) and for “show-off” (Instagram, 
Facebook). Unlike traditional cameras, the Samsung model requires an extra monthly fee 
from the operators to power the device with high speed connectivity unless you are using 
the Wi-Fi.   
7.3  The computer industry 
During the last decade and especially during the last five years we have seen a lot of new 
companies entering the mobile industry. Entrants from the computer industry like Apple, 
Hewlett-Packard (HP), Asus and Microsoft have in different ways and with different success 
tried to capitalize on the mobile market. Microsoft has its mobile OS which is struggling 
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with a declining market share that today is about 2% of the smartphone market (Business 
Insider, 2013b). Asus has a different strategy and is selling a ”Padfone” which is an Android 
based 4.7” smartphone that you can slide into a tablet and use it with the larger, tablet screen 
(according to asus.com). HP, an established player in the PC industry waited until 2010 
before they entered the mobile industry.  
When computer companies in the early 00s started to move towards other industries (Apple 
towards music players and Microsoft towards mobile OSs) HP saw business opportunities in 
the PC industry and in 2001 they acquired Compaq. Almost a decade later HP tried to enter 
the mobile market by acquiring the smartphone manufacturer Palm (Hewlett Packard, 2010). 
”HP did the right thing to acquire Palm, but they did it far too late. In 2010 the game was 
over” (Dediu, 2011a). A little bit more than a year after the acquisition, HP announced that 
they would discontinue to develop the Palm OS which at the time had been renamed to HP 
webOS (Business Wire, 2011). Many companies have tried but so far, the only company to 
really succeed the transition from computer to mobile is Apple (Dediu, 2011a). 
7.3.1 Change in internet usage – change for the computer industry 
Internet was originally created in an environment that existed solely of computers and, up 
until the launch of Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) with Wi-Fi connectivity during the 
early 00s, that was still the case. Since then, mobile phones with internet connectivity have 
increased continuously and in 2009, there were more mobile phones with internet 
connectivity than there were computers. Although internet has started to move beyond the 
computer and the fact that there are more phones with internet than computers, computers 
still account for a vast majority of website traffic.  
 
Figure 7.4 E-commerce web traffic by device (Business Insider, 2013b) 
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As illustrated in figure 7.4, in Q3 2012 around 80% of all e-commerce web traffic was from 
computers and 10% came from mobile phones. In overall web traffic, computers accounted 
for approximately 84% in early 2013 (Jones, 2013). The trend, according to figure 7.2, seems 
to be that computers' share of website traffic is declining with a couple of percentage points 
per quarter and is slowly being eaten up by tablets and mobile phones.  
Sales  
Market shares in the computer industry have been quite stable for the last five years with HP 
as the market leader (17% 2012). The top five largest companies, HP, Lenovo, Dell, Acer 
and Apple together captures about half of all sales and altogether 350 million computers 
were sold in 2012 (Business Insider, 2013b).  However the increase in sales seems to have 
stagnated and at the same time, mobile phones and tablets are steadily increasing in sales. 
Illustrated in figure 7.5, smartphones' percentage of total internet device sales has increased 
dramatically and in Q3 2012, smartphone sales accounted for 60%. Tablets are also 
increasing in popularity and account for 10% of sales and 8% of website traffic.  
 
Figure 7.5 Internet device sales (Business Insider, 2013b) 
If you combine computer, smartphone, tablet and PDA sales, the market shares changes 
dramatically. HP, which is the market leader for computers drops to a fourth place with 7% 
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units sold in 2011. The second and third places are also captured by companies mainly 
manufacturing mobile phones (Samsung and Nokia). (Ahonen, 2012b, p. 79) 
7.3.2 The developing world – smartphones instead of computers 
In the western world, most homes have a TV, often a fixed broadband and a computer. In 
contrast, in the emerging markets, TV is not something that exists in every home and land 
line broadband is very rare. Smartphones have up until now, mostly been sold in the western 
world and 2012 Africa only accounted for 5% (10 million) of the total smartphone sales 
(Business Insider, 2013b). In the western world, about 44% of the population has a 
smartphone compared to 7% in the emerging world. (Ahonen, 2012a) 
As smartphones continue to drop in prices and the smartphone penetration continues to 
increase in the developing world, new opportunities and markets will emerge. In the western 
world, 54% of the population have a computer and 40% uses mobile internet. In the 
emerging world, only 11% have a computer but 22% have access to mobile internet. In the 
western world, the smartphone worked as a complement to the computer (since most people 
already had one) and other media platforms. In the developing world however, the 
smartphone will be the first multimedia device people will own since most people do not 
have a computer or a TV. Mobile phone services are increasing in popularity in the emerging 
world. In India, 21% of the mobile phone users consume news on their device and in Kenya, 
mobile banking accounts for around 30% of the country's GDP! (Ahonen, 2012a, pp. 159-
163) 
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8 Analysis 
8.1 Value flow framework 
After working with the empirics there is a need to update the theoretical framework (p. 25) 
to a new version. The area of research has covered disruptive innovation which can be 
describes as a trigger for change. Change in this case is value migration. Value migration can 
be triggered from other things than a disruptive innovation and to broaden this initial part of 
the framework we have renamed it trigger instead of disruption.  
Furthermore, the second stage of our former framework, value migration, is now called 
direction to emphasize that the important part of this step is to look at the direction of the 
value flow instead of just establish that value migration has occurred.  
Finally, in the former framework we had only taken into account the impacts from the 
company's strategy on value migration. After having studied the empirics, we realize that 
these factors comes from both the company (its business model) and from the environment 
it operates in (competitors, its industry and other industries). We have thus used a more 
generic terminology to include all factors that accelerate or decelerate the value flow. This is 
all leading to the outcome, which is the last step of our framework of analysis. We will call 
this for our value flow framework. 
Figure 8.1 The updated value migration framework now consists of four steps of analysis. 
Measure & Evaluate Identify 
Trigger 
 Disruption 
 External shocks 
 New technology 
 Business model 
innovation 
Direction 
 Out or inflow? 
 Inter or intra industry? 
Accelerators & 
Decelerators 
 Network externalities 
 Modular or integrated? 
 Lock-in effect 
 Entry barriers 
 Good-enough state of 
product 
Outcome 
 Value migration ratio 
 Department’s % of 
revenue 
 Market share 
 Margin 
 Industry profit share 
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8.1.1 Triggers 
A trigger is something that initiates a change, in this case meaning a value migration. This 
something can consist of several different aspects. A disruption (Christensen C. M., 2003) is 
clearly an example of a trigger. Within his definition of a disruptive innovation lies both 
technological and business model innovations. Furthermore, Slywotzky (1996) argues that a 
value migration can be caused by external factors such as legislation, technological progress 
and financial instability. Johnson et al.  (2008) introduces the business model innovation that 
also is something that can trigger value flow.  
8.1.2 Directions 
After the triggers are identified, the direction of the value flow needs to be recognized. As 
earlier mentioned, value can migrate between or within an industry and it can be absorbed by 
or taken away from an industry/company. This is the Slywotzky (1996) way of doing it. 
Apart from this, two different industries and products can serve the same need and by 
looking at how this need is served relatively through time, value migration can be identified 
when between industries.  
8.1.3 Accelerators and decelerators 
When the trigger and the direction of the value migration is set, it is important to look at the 
environment surrounding the flow of value (company and industry) and look at how it 
affects the value flow. Generally, when the flow of value is absorbed by a company, the 
decelerating activities (defense) comes from outside the company and vice versa. Apart from 
industry affecting value flow, it can also differ depending on the company's characteristics, 
e.g. adjustability in its business model (Slywotzky, 1996) or from its relationship with 
important stakeholders (Porter, 1979). 
In this step we will use the theories regarding business innovation (Johnson et al., 2008), 
platform strategy & network effects (Cusumano, 2010a; Cusumano, 2010b; Cusumano, 2011;  
Kenney & Pon, 2011), Walled garden (Mehra, 2011), entry barriers (Christensen & Wessel, 
2012) and responses to disruptive strategic innovation (Charitou & Markides, 2003). We 
have found that they all in some way or another affect the magnitude of the value flow.  
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8.1.4 Outcome 
Finally, the outcome of the value migration will be presented. The main theoretical tribute in 
this section will be Slywotzky's (1996) value migration ratio which functions as a measure of 
which phase the value flow is in. Moreover, a brief summary of the empirical findings will be 
presented. Also, the outcome can measure and evaluate whether or not the identification 
process of the trigger, the directions and the accelerators and decelerators are in line with the 
empirical results.  
8.2 Nokia 
8.2.1 Trigger 
In 2007, Nokia had a significant part of the smartphone market and the OS with the biggest 
market share, Symbian, was tightly connected to them. However, Symbian was not designed 
for third party developers and therefore did not experience same growth in OTT content as 
its new competitors; Android and iOS. Nokia kept on producing Symbian phones and, 
without a competitive ecosystem, they started to lose value. Nokia did not realize that the 
base of competition had shifted and was no longer in product performance, but rather in 
flexibility. Their incapacity of adjusting their business model to the shift of demand is a 
common issue for successful companies when the market matures and this triggered a value 
flow (Christensen et al., 2001). 
8.2.2 Direction 
Since Nokia could not compete with other handset OEMs with better ecosystems value 
started to flow out of Nokia. The total revenue and volume of the handset OEM industry 
was increasing rapidly but in Nokia the trend was going in the opposite direction. This 
implies that the value stayed in the industry and thus the flow out of Nokia was captured by 
other industry competitors.  
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8.2.3 Accelerators & Decelerators 
According to Dediu (2013d), Nokia's relationship with the operators prevented them from 
fully capitalize on the available technology to launch a multi touch smart device before 
anyone else. As the point Bryer (2013) made, technology can never surprise anyone in the 
industry, so it is safe to say that Nokia knew about and could use the technology resulting in 
the iPhone. The operators did not see how they could increase their profits through this new 
device and this hindered Nokia from preventing the trigger in the first place.  
As Android and iOS attracted lots of third party developers and managed to build an 
ecosystem of applications, Symbian was not designed with the emerging smartphone 
ecosystem in mind and lost in competitiveness due to less content. Thus, Android and iOS 
expanded rapidly with high network externalities boosting the growth and value capture 
while Symbian lost market share, fast.  
Since Symbian was not designed for the new ecosystem based smartphone market, they had 
to abandon it and choose a competitor's OS. This is a typical example of leader's dilemma 
(Kenney & Pon, 2011). Nokia had two strategic choices regarding their OS: 
1. Develop their own OS 
In this environment, with strong network effects, time is crucial since it is very 
difficult to start a network with already established alternatives. To develop a mobile 
OS is time consuming and also expensive. Thus, this was not a good alternative. 
2. Adopt an already existing OS 
In the OS industry, there were practically two options; Android or Windows Phone. 
As Android was the far more established OS between the two, Nokia would have 
lost the opportunity to create a competitive advantage if choosing them. Windows 
Phone did not have as large ecosystem as Android but it gave Nokia the possibility 
to differentiate and charge a premium price. 
As we know, Nokia chose Windows Phone and as network theory tells us, Windows' OS has 
struggled to stay competitive against larger ecosystems in the smartphone industry.   
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8.2.4 Outcome 
The outcome of this value migration for Nokia is: 
 Nokia is now second after Samsung in terms of mobile phone shipments and in the 
smartphone segment they only shipped 35 million units, six times less than Samsung.  
 Nokia has gone from having 70% (2007) of the handset OEM industry profit to 
making a net loss (2012).  
 Nokia's value migration ratio between 2007 and 2011 has moved from 1.7 (stable 
phase) to 0.33 which, according to Slywotzky's theory, confirms that value is flowing 
out from Nokia.  
 Mobile department's percentage of revenue has doubled from accounting for one 
fourth of Samsung's revenue in 2007 to half of their revenue in 2012. 
 The handset part of Nokia has gone from accounting for 80% of revenue in 2007 to 
less than 50% in 2012.  
8.3 Apple 
8.3.1 Triggers 
During the late 00s, the mobile industry moved towards the PC industry when looking at 
product features. More and more features traditionally found in a PC could now be found in 
a handset like e-mail and web browsing. Apple, who was not present in the mobile market 
decided to release a phone which triggered a value flow. According to Dediu (2013d) their 
non-existing relationship with any operators made it possible for Apple to design a phone 
without the operator's strategic opinions in mind.  
There is two main reasons that made the iPhone a value flow trigger: 
1. It managed to link two novel activities in a new way which made their customer 
value proposition more attractive (Amit & Zott, 2012; Johnson et al., 2008). The two 
activities were regular mobile phone use with a superior browsing experience (Bryer, 
2013). The touch interface was new to the market and it made web browsing very 
intuitive and easy to use.  
2. It opened up a new door to Apple's already existing walled garden. As explained in 
the empirics, by the time of the iPhone's release, Apple already had a successful 
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ecosystem with its computer OS, OS X, their music program iTunes and the music 
player iPod. With the iPhone, Apple made it possible to enter the Apple sphere from 
a mobile phone. Since the platform already was up and running the big user base 
(more users means higher value) made it more attractive to enter according to 
network theory and Metcalfe's law (Katz & Shapiro, 1985; Cusumano & Gawer, 
2002). 
8.3.2 Direction 
The iPhone was a success, and thus value started to flow into Apple. If we look at the profit 
share in the industry, Apple gained shares in the same rate as Nokia lost which implies that 
the value migration in terms of profit was taken place inside the industry, from Nokia to 
Apple (Business Insider, 2013b).  
8.3.3 Accelerators and decelerators 
Apple managed to capture 70% of the handset OEM industry's profit in just five years' time 
which indicates that the accelerators in this case were more prominent than the decelerators. 
As mentioned above, network externalities had a great impact on the value flow. Since a 
network's value grows exponentially, and apple's network already had been growing steadily 
from the 2001 when iTunes and iPod were released, the effect of the iPhone was very 
prominent. What further accelerated the value flow was Apple's strategic intention to create 
a walled garden with strong lock-in effects. iMessage is a feature that allows the user to send 
texts through data given that the receiver also has an iPhone. iTunes is preinstalled on all 
Apple devices, functioning as a customer acquisition tool when selling content. The 
convenience of owning multiple Apple products when dealing with features like iMessage, 
calendar, notifications etc. functions as a way for Apple to lock-in their customers as they 
synchronize seamlessly between the devices.   
This value migration absorbed by Apple has been tried to be stopped by different players. As 
a way for Google to break Apples dominance and introducing themselves to the mobile 
industry, they launched Android. Android's more open approach together with OTT content 
both distributed by the browser (available to anyone) and through other OS's platforms (e.g. 
Google Play) are all decelerating Apple's value absorption.  
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8.3.4 Outcome 
The outcome of this value migration for Apple is: 
 Apple is capturing 70% of all profits in the handset OEM industry due to first and 
foremost of their attractive ecosystem, but also their strong brand (2nd highest valued 
in the world after Coca-Cola) and fully integrated user experience.  
 Apple has the highest ASPs of all handset OEMs and has remained fairly constant at 
over $600 which is a lot higher than the industry average. We can see two reasons for 
this. Firstly, it is because they only sell three different phones which all are high-end 
smartphones. Secondly, they can take a high premium price on their iPhone, not 
because it contains superior hardware but rather because the iPhone is the only 
mobile phone that provides entry to Apple's ecosystem.  
 Apple's value migration ratio between 2007 and 2011 has moved between 3-5 which, 
according to Slywotzky's theory, confirms that value is flowing into Apple.  
 Apple's mobile department's percentage of their total revenue has risen and is now 
about 50% 
8.4 Samsung 
8.4.1 Triggers 
At the same time as the smartphone market started to expand in the mid 00s, Samsung had a 
special role as both key supplier to Apple's iPhone but also as a competitor in the industry. 
Apple's orders gave Samsung insider information about Apple's projected sales numbers and 
quickly decided to follow. More importantly, the components that Samsung were experts on 
became increasingly important and valuable in the smartphone market, with higher demand 
on large HD-screens and microprocessors. They controlled what Christensen (2003) defines 
as the interdependent links of the value chain, which according to him is what generates the 
most of the profits.  
8.4.2 Directions 
Their revenue has doubled from 2007-2012 and the department selling handsets have tripled 
during the same period which indicates that they have absorbed value.  
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Figure 8.2 Nokia and Samsung, volume (Annual reports; Business Insider, 2013c) 
If Apple took Nokia's profit, Samsung has clearly gained value by capturing Nokia's volume. 
Figure 8.2 illustrates how Samsung and Nokia's mobile phone volume has developed. The 
only segment that has increased is Samsung's smartphone shipments. Samsung is now the 
biggest manufacturer of mobile phones, and as this position is relative others, the conclusion 
is that they have taken this value from other handset OEMs, and mainly from Nokia.  
8.4.3 Accelerators and decelerators 
As Christensen states, “Don´t outsource the thing that's going to make lots of money next” 
(Christensen et al., 2001, p. 74), Samsung has kept their production of components whereas 
other handset OEMs have not. This means that Samsung is able to capture profits all along 
the value chain where other handset OEMs have outsourced this production and lost 
potential gains.  
Their market leadership in components also gives them the advantage of shorter time-to-
market compared to their competitors. A shorter time to market means first-mover 
advantage, which gives them the ability to keep on absorbing value. Their investments in 
their brand have given them a stronger recognition which also have led to increased sales 
(Dediu, 2013d).  
They have made efforts in creating their own OS with examples of BADA and Tizen. If they 
would have succeeded with this, an even greater part of the value chain could have been 
captured and their potential differentiation would be more significant, giving them the ability 
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to charge a higher premium. As it is now with Android commoditizing most of the mobile 
OS industry, this is not possible.  
8.4.4 Outcome 
The outcome of this value migration for Samsung is: 
 Samsung is the biggest handset OEM in terms of volume and they account for 
around 15% of world sales of mobile phones. They also have the biggest market 
share in the smartphones segment. 
 Samsung is capturing around 30% of the operating profit in the industry. 
 Samsung's value migration ratio between 2007 and 2011 has moved between 2.5-3.5 
which, according to Slywotzky's theory, confirms that value is flowing into Samsung.  
 Mobile department's percentage of revenue has doubled from accounting for one 
fourth of Samsung's revenue in 2007 to half of their revenue in 2012. 
 Although Samsung has been profitable in the handset OEM segment of their 
business, it remains unknown the internal pricing between that department and the 
component manufacturing department, making it uncertain to tell if Samsung is 
capturing profits by selling handset or by selling components.  
8.5 Android 
8.5.1 Triggers 
During the mid 00s, more and more people started to connect to the internet through their 
handsets instead of using a PC. At the same time, the mobile industry was moving towards 
the PC industry and IT, with a higher demand within the industry on PC and IT 
competence. This evolvement made it possible and necessary for Google to enter the mobile 
industry. This led to the launch of Android.  
8.5.2 Directions 
Android's is the biggest mobile OS in terms of user base and the second biggest in numbers 
of applications. Android is free to license and has thus not created any value within the 
mobile industry. Instead, it has commoditized the OS industry, leading to value flowing to 
Google. This value has been transferred into more Android users, which according to 
Metcalfe's law means a higher value of Android, and thereby Google. The money lost by 
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Google for giving Android away for free is captured in another part of their business model; 
ads. This is a typical example of a two-sided business model, and in terms of value flow, 
value has flown from the handset industry's OS part to the ad industry. 
8.5.3 Accelerators and decelerators 
First of all, Android is completely free to use which according to Bowman and Ambrosini's 
(2000) definition of value gives Android an unlimited consumer surplus. This has accelerated 
the flow of value, with less incentives for handset OEMs to develop their own OSs.  
As with every other platform, network externalities have further accelerated Android's 
growth. The same can be said about their biggest competitor, iOS. Android has a higher 
amount of users but iOS and Apple are able to charge a premium for their OS. A decelerator 
in this case would be the competition from other OSs, with Apple's iOS as their biggest 
rival.  
8.5.4 Outcome 
The outcome of this value migration for Android is: 
 Android has in its four year existence captured 70% of the smartphone OS market. 
 Since it is free of charge, Android has commoditized the OS in the mobile industry.  
 Google's value migration ratio between 2007 and 2011 has averaged 7 which, 
according to Slywotzky's theory, confirms that value is flowing into Google. 
However, how big part of this that is absorbed from the mobile industry is uncertain 
due to Google's many different business areas.  
8.6 Kindle  
8.6.1 Triggers 
Lower hardware prices along with a free OS and increased usage of internet on mobile 
devices strengthened the incentives for Amazon to enter the handset OEM industry. This 
resulted in the launch of Kindle.  
8.6.2 Direction 
Since Kindle is subsidized, the price difference between an unsubsidized comparable tablet 
and the subsidized Kindle reflects the value that has been flowing out of the handset OEM 
industry and in to retail. We can prove this by the following chain of causalities. Kindle has 
72 
 
been sold in around 30 million units. Kindle users are more likely to visit and consume 
Amazon products than other tablet users. Thus, value has moved to retailing (Amazon) from 
the handset OEM industry through the subsidization and the sales of Kindle devices.  
8.6.3 Accelerators and decelerators 
We have seen no significant correlation between Amazon active users and sales of Kindle 
devices. The impact Kindle has had on Amazon sales are hard to measure, as well as the 
impact Kindle sales have had on sales of other tablets. Amazon has added a novel activity 
(tablets) to their CVP which is a business model innovation (Amit & Zott, 2012). However, 
we have not seen any big impacts of this value flow on the handset side. Instead it is on the 
retailing side that we have seen growth in both revenue, active user base and profits. How 
big part of this that can be explained by value migration from the mobile industry is, as 
earlier mentioned, hard to estimate.  
8.6.4 Outcome 
The outcome of this value migration for Kindle is: 
 They have captured a market share of around 20% in the tablet industry by selling an 
accumulated number of 30 million units.  
 Amazon's value migration ratio between 2007 and 2011 has constantly been between 
1.6-1.9 which, according to Slywotzky's theory, states that Amazon is in the stable 
phase where no value is flowing in or out. This corresponds to our empirical results. 
8.7 Technology absorption 
8.7.1 Triggers  
Ever since handsets were equipped with the clock feature, handsets have been absorbing 
technology from different industries. This evolvement has increased in pace since the 
introduction of the smartphone and as technology becomes better and better, more features 
get commoditized and achieve a good-enough status. This has caused a value migrations 
from the consumer electronics industry to the handset OEM industry.  
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8.7.2 Direction 
More and more features are being put into the mobile phone and thus value is captured by 
the handset industry. The features are, as mentioned, technology and value from other 
industries so the value flow is between industries.  
8.7.3 Accelerators and decelerators 
This value migration is driven by the fact that technology achieve a good-enough status. 
When a product achieves a good enough-status, value is moved towards suppliers and/or 
new entrants, and the product often becomes modular (Christensen et al., 2001). Due to the 
high “competition of the pocket”, the fact that handsets still are able to include more 
features is accelerating the value flow towards the handset OEM industry.  
As the case has been with many of the value flows in this thesis, by adding novel activities, 
the mobile industry has been able to innovate their business model and increase its value 
flow. By linking camera and internet connectivity (the ability to share pictures) and GPS with 
mobility, (always carry navigation tools with you) the mobile industry has been able to 
absorb value. The convenience of having all these tools in a single device has accelerated the 
value flow.  
Chain of causality: 
1. It is convenient to have all your features (if those features are good-enough) in one 
device…  
2. …if that device is mobile… (since you have paid for the features, it is nice to be able 
to use them as often as possible) 
3. …and is equipped with the highest prioritized feature… 
4. …which is connectivity…(being able to contact other people and extract 
information is more vital than being able to take photos)  
5. …which is why the handset has absorbed the other technologies and not vice versa.  
This also has to do with the modularity and good-enough status on the different industries. 
It is much easier for a handset OEM to equip their products with a camera than it is for a 
camera company to equip their products with a phone feature. The camera as a component 
has thus become modular, along with the GPS, the alarm clock etc.  
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8.7.4 Outcomes 
The outcome of the value migration due to technology absorption is: 
 Nine of ten pictures are taken from a mobile phone 
 The sales of internet devices have tripled in the last four years. However, PC sales 
have been stable and all the growth has been captured by handsets. 
 Although the sales of smartphones are higher than PC sales, PC still accounts for 
84% of all web traffic. 
 Since this evolve many different companies and those companies tend to have 
multiple business designs, the value migration ratio does not say anything of 
significance.  
8.8 Cross-case analysis 
8.8.1 Department's percentage of total revenue 
If we look at the recipient of value flows as business designs, they can be translated as a 
department within a company consisting of several different business designs. Within those 
companies, business designs (departments) that have received an inflow of value has 
increased in revenue relatively to the rest of the departments and vice versa. This trend has 
been observed in Apple (mobile phones) ↑, Samsung (mobile phones) ↑, Nokia (mobile 
phones) ↓, Garmin (automotive/mobile) ↓, TomTom (consumer) ↓, Sony (digital imaging) ↓ 
among others. This can be an interesting aspect to add to the value migration theory as a way 
to identify past value flows.  
8.8.2 Differentiation and competition across and between platforms 
As earlier stated, the most prominent differentiation in handsets is the OS and its ecosystem. 
This gives Apple the opportunity to charge a premium price compared to the price of an 
Android device, both built on the same/similar hardware components. Appose to the 
competition and differentiation between iOS and Android, it is interesting to look at on 
what basis Android devices can differentiate and compete against each other. Samsung, the 
most successful of all Android selling handset OEMs, are actually unique in that matter as 
they, unlike other Android selling handset OEMs, are making a profit. They can achieve this 
because of their fast time-to-market, strong brand and unique value chain. Apart from what 
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Samsung is doing, it is very hard for Android selling handset OEMs to differentiate and 
capture value.  
8.8.3 Value allocated in platforms and ecosystems 
Both Android and iOS have gained value by functioning as a distributer of content, having 
the billing relationship with the customers. The value that Google and Apple have invested 
when created the platforms are covered for in different ways. Apple charge their customers 
directly by including it in the premium price tag they have on their phones whereas in 
Google's case, the ad business covers the costs of developing the OS.  
8.8.4 Value migration ratio 
The value migration ratio has confirmed our empiric results in all of the cases, which is 
illustrated in figure 8.3. All companies with a ratio above 2.0 have, according to the empiric 
result, experienced a value migration inflow. Nokia, with a ratio of 0.8 or less has, according 
to the empirics, experienced a value migration outflow and Amzon has been in between 
those two lines and has, according to our empirical findings not experienced a value 
migration in or outflow.  
 
Figure 8.3 Value migration ratios (Annual reports) 
To better understand the ratios and how they move over time, we have looked at which 
factors that stipulates the ratio, illustrated below. Slywotzky chose revenue as a relative 
measure to make companies comparable in size. The market capitalization measures the 
power of a business design to create and capture value which in turn partly depends on the 
revenue (Slywotzky, 1996). Thus, a change in the value migration ratio depends on how 
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much of a change in revenue that is reflected in the market capitalization. For example, if 
both revenue and market capitalization increase with 10%, the ratio will remain unchanged. 
Consequently, a company can receive a higher ratio with decreasing revenue, given that the 
market capitalization decreases less in relation to the revenue.  
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =
Market cap.
Revenue
=
𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 × 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 × 𝐴𝑆𝑃
 
The same reasoning can be applied to the revenue's factors, ASP and volume, where changes 
in ASP directly impacts revenue and indirectly changes market capitalization due to changed 
evaluation of the business designs ability to create and capture value.   
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9 Conclusion 
9.1 Academic contribution 
We believe that Slywotzky's (1996) theory on value migration lacks focus on what triggers a 
value flow. We have with our value flow framework created a framework that emphasizes 
important aspects that triggers value flows such as business model innovation and 
disruption. With the trigger established, it is much easier to determine the direction of the 
flow and on which industry level it occurs. From existing theories, we have also further 
enlightened what accelerates and decelerates the value flow.  
The theories mentioned during the accelerators and decelerators does not focus on value 
migration per se. However, we have put them in a new context where they help us to 
identify the magnitude of the value flow and they also show what kind of tools that 
companies can use in order to control value flow. It is important to draw a line between the 
accelerators and decelerators that the given company can influence and the ones that are set 
by the industry or product. Network externalities makes platforms grow exponentially, and 
that is a good thing if you are leading the platform race but it could be devestating if you are 
a slow starter.  
Figure 9.1 Value flow framework 
After the identifying process is completed, it is important to measure and evaluate what 
effect the value migration has had. We have applied the value migration ratio on several 
Measure & Evaluate Identify 
Trigger 
 Disruption 
 External shocks 
 New technology 
 Business model 
innovation 
Direction 
 Out or inflow? 
 Inter or intra industry? 
Accelerators & 
Decelerators 
 Network externalities 
 Modular or integrated? 
 Lock-in effect 
 Entry barriers 
 Good-enough state of 
product 
Outcome 
 Value migration ratio 
 Department’s % of 
revenue 
 Market share 
 Margin 
 Industry profit share 
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companies during the case study and on every company it confirmed our empirical results. It 
is also of interest to look at other financial figures in order to further measure the value flow.  
When we used this framework we also saw a strong correlation between the relative size of 
the department's revenue (that was exposed to the value flow) compared to the total revenue 
and the direction of the flow. This is a simple tool that can be used to identify past value 
flows. 
9.2 Empirical contribution 
9.2.1 Intra industry empirical contribution 
Our intra industry empirical contribution is illustrated in the infograph on next side. In the 
infograph, we illustrate the biggest and most prominent changes in the industry between the 
handset OEMs Nokia, Apple and Samsung between the years 2009 and 2012. Before 2009, 
the smartphone definition was not entirely clear and therefore the labels have differed, even 
though the same trend visible below started earlier. We have mapped the important changes 
in the industry and this information can be both helpful and useful for stakeholders of the 
industry. The main cause of this value migration is that the base of competition has shifted 
from product performance to flexibility, differentiation and speed which in this industry 
means ecosystem, brand and time-to-market. By high-lightening this shift, managers in other 
industries can learn and become extra observant so that the time of reaction becomes 
shorter.  
9.2.2 Inter industry empirical contribution 
The asymmetric business models and the two-sided platforms have proven to be a cause of 
value migration. This is a natural cause of their nature, since resources is spent in one end 
and value is absorbed in the other, and if these parts operate in different industries, value 
migration has to happen.  
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9.3 Further research 
This thesis has not only rendered in answers and understanding, it has opened up for more 
interesting studies. During our research we have encountered many interesting subjects and 
phenomenon that could be the foundation for another thesis. Here are the topics we would 
suggest for further research.  
A quantitative study on the correlation between the relative size of the department's 
revenue (that was exposed to the value flow) compared to the total revenue and the 
direction of the value flow. During our research this was one of the patterns that we saw 
correlated strongly to value migration and this phenomenon has not been mentioned at all in 
any of the theory that we have gone through. Although we saw a strong pattern, a 
quantitative study must be done to solidify the validity of this finding.  
Research if the value flow framework is applicable to other industries and other 
cases. Our value flow framework has been an excellent tool to map and analyze value 
migration and it would be interesting to see if it is applicable to other industries. The 
framework would probably need to be revised a number of times before it is usable in all 
cases and environments.  
Examine if asymmetric business models and two-sided platforms between industries 
always result in value migration. This is also a strong pattern that we saw which could 
work as a research question in another thesis. It lies in an asymmetric business models nature 
to operate in between industries (hence the word asymmetric) but is it possible to have an 
asymmetric business model without creating a shift in value?  
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11 Appendix 
11.1 Article 
Our article is based upon the design of online news site http://www.svd.se/naringsliv/ 
The Bloodbath in Mobile 
In just four years, Apple has absorbed almost 70% of the handset 
OEM industry’s profits. The rest is captured by Samsung, now the 
biggest handset OEM with a volume of almost 400 million units. 
What happened to Nokia? [INFOGRAPH] 
 
Tim Cook presenting the new iPhone 5.  
FOTO: ERIC RISBERG/AP 
21 May 2013 CET 10:41 , uppdated: 21 May 2013 CET 10:55 
 
The shift of power has happened fast and in just four years, Apple has been able to 
capture astonishing 69% of all profit in the industry. Back in 2007, Nokia was the 
company holding 70% of all the profit. Now they are making a loss.  
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According to industry specialists Viktor Lundqvist and Erik Lundin, this has to do with 
the shift in the basis of competition.  
– Back pre-iPhone, the basis of competition was product performance. This has shifted 
to flexibility, brand and time-to-market. Nokia did make the best phones, but along with 
the smartphone trend, ecosystem has replaced performance as the most important 
factor.  
The iPhone operating system, iOS, with the ecosystem platform App Store is what 
matters. What about Samsung? 
– Samsung is different. Their unique role as key supplier to the iPhone gave them a head 
start. Their component making gives them two competitive advantages; fastest time-to-
market and value capturing along a bigger part of the value chain. They are also the ones 
that spend the most on brand building. 
 
Nokia has tried to build their own ecosystem but without success.  
READ ALSO Smartphone Hackers 
READ ALSO Top 10 Real Estate Stars 
READ ALSO SocGen’s Darkest Secret  
Attacks from other industries, are also a part of the new landscape of mobile. Retailer 
Amazon has launched their Kindle, a heavily subsidized line of tablets as a way to attract 
traffic to Amazon.com. Google provides Android for free in an attempt to increase their 
ad revenue on the expenses of the operating system parts of the mobile industry, which is 
now completely commoditized.  
On the other hand, smartphones has changed the way we use other consumer 
electronics. Today, 9 out of 10 pictures are taken by a phone.  
–The connectivity and smartness found in a phone makes cameras and GPS devices 
more attractive to use.   
READ ALSO The Viking Economy – A Tale of the Nordic Countries 
READ ALSO What You Didn’t Realize About UFOs 
The future of Nokia remains unknown, and CEO Stephen Elop recently suggested that we 
might see a Nokia Android device in the future. As for now, sales of Nokia Windows 
Phone devices have been disappointing with only a sixth of Samsung’s volume in 
comparison. 
Quiz! What Do You Know About the Dollar? 
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Nokia Apple SamsungNokia Apple Samsung
  
19. 21,009$M (-39,74%) 
MOBILE DEPARTMENT'S SHARE OF TOTAL REVENUE 
2009 
 
2012 
FEATURE PHONE AND SMARTPHONE SHIPMENT 
1,383M UNITS 172M UNITS 2,412M UNITS 674M UNITS 
33%
-2%
35%
69%
15%
34%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
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80%
100%
2. 76,562$M (+496%) 9. 32,893$M (+187%) 
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Others
Nokia
Samsung
Others
Smartphones
Nokia
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Samsung Others
Nokia
Samsung
Others
Smartphones
Nokia, Apple and Samsung 
PROFIT SHARE IN HANDSET OEM INDUSTRY 
2012 BRAND RANKING 
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11.2 Value migration ratio 
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